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THE VIRTUE OF LIBERALITY IN AMERICAN
COMMUNAL LIFE
Linda R. Hirshman *
The last straw for me was television producer Aaron Spelling's 600
square feet of closet space. 1 But the straw was really only a straw in
the wind, a wind that has for some years carried signs of dissatisfaction with the extreme individualism of American life and law. 2 In

* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University of Chicago.
The Marshall Ewell Fund and Diana CoJlins provided research support. Thanks to Constance
Abrams, Randy Barnett, Ronald Collins, Steven Heyman, Gordon Hylton, Kenneth Karst, Kenneth Kress, H. Jefferson Powell, Carol Rose, Suzanna Sherry, and David Skover for their help
("Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this
by reason of their own nature •..." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VIII.3,.at 196 (Ross
trans. 1925) (World's Classics Paperback ed.)).
1. Stein, The House ofSpelling: Massive Construction Project in Holmby Hills Flusters Some
Neighbors, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, § 5, at 1, col. 1 (home ed.) (Aaron Spelling has built an
addition onto his home "to allow [room for] two clothes closet areas and adjacent balconies,
approximately 28 feet and 42 feet in length and both approximately 8 feet in width.").
2. First life and then law, of course. Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 875-83 (1987). The impulse originally sprang almost simultaneously
from philosophy, sociology, and history. In philosophy: See generally R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND
0BJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983); A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983);
Taylor, Hegel: History and Politics, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 177 (M. Sandel ed. 1984).
In sociology: See generally B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE (1984); R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON,
HABITS OF THE HEART (1985) [hereinafter HABITS OF THE HEART]; M. JANOWITZ, THE RECONSTRUCTIONS OF PATRIOTISM: EDUCATION FOR CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS (1983); Barber, The
Compromised Republic: Public Purposelessness in America, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 19 (R. Horwitz ed. 1977).
In history: See generally J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Pocock, Virtues, Rights and
Manners: A Mode/for Historians of Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353 (1981).
Legal scholars followed, and the connections to other disciplines and to each other are, as
always, ambiguous and oblique, e.g., H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF
POETRY (1973), but any canon of civic republican jurisprudence must include: G. STONE, L.
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986); M. TUSHNET, RED,
WHITE AND BLUE (1988); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Michelman,
Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987)
[hereinafter Michelman, Possession]; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword:
Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self
Government]; Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REV.
963 (1987); Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987);
Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537
(1983); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Sunstein, Lochner's Leg983
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American legal philosophy and its first-born, constitutional theory, 3
individualism reached its zenith in the rights-based theories and arguments that have dominated discourse since John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice. 4 The dissatisfaction is expressed most completely by revisionist scholars calling for the revival of commitment to the common, or
public, good, beyond the sum of individual goods. 5 These revisionist
writings are generally categorized under the rubric of civic republicanism:6 civic, to distinguish the enterprise from capital R Republicanacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 421 (1987); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1986); Sunstein, Two Faces of Liberalism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245 (1986); Sunstein,
Madison and Constitutional Equality, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 11 (1986); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest
Groups].
In the disaffection with extreme individualism I include Professor Kenneth Karst's seminal
work on community: K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989) [hereinafter K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA]; Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986); Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447 (1984); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter
Karst, Equal Citizenship]; and the growing body of feminist jurisprudence: Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Minow, The Supreme Coprt 1986 Term Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) [hereinafter Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice]; Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TuL. L. REV. 1591 (1989); West,
The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531 (1988); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic
Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV, 817
(1986); West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV L. REV.
1449 (1986); West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral a11d
Political Visions ofFranz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985) [hereinafter
West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice]; West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: All Aesthetic Analysis
of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985).
3. See Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189,
189-212 (1988) (describing rights-orientation of American constitutional theory).
4. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). As Robert Nozick described Rawls' influence,
"(p]olitical philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not." R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 183 (1974); see also Collins & Skover, supra note 3, at
220-39. Collins and Skover "note that 21 of the 25 most-cited constitutional law articles in
American law journals published from 1947 to 1985 are dedicated to individual rights issues."
Id. at 220 n.121. The most influential examples of rights theories include R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE·
VIEW (1980); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); L. TRIBE, CONSTITU·
TJONAL CHOICES 165-266 (1985). I include in the category of individualists the law and
economics theorists, because, although many critics categorize the law and economics movement
as utilitarian, and thus not inherently individualistic, law and economics theory partakes of that
subset of utilitarianism that equates social good with the sum of individual wealth-maximizing
decisions. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LA w (1979);
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); R. POSNER,
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
5. See, e.g.. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1507-08 (distinguishing pluralism as
not directed "towards any common ideal or self-transcendant end"); Sunstein, Beyo11d the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1554-55.
6. As Paul Brest pointed out recently, the phrase is redundant, but useful. Brest, Further
Beyond the Republican Revival 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 n.l (1988).
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ism; and republican, to emphasize. self-rule through political
participation and deliberative decisionmaking. 7 .
To this date, however, the revisionists' prescriptions for change
have centered largely on directing the process of lawmaking and judicial review toward a public-regarding process, not on the substance of
the good life for individuals or societies. 8 There are at least two reasons for this restraint. First, the civic republicans are haunted by the
ghost of Earl Warren. 9 The revision began, and,. to some extent remains associated with, the role of the federal judiciary as the most
meaningful source of legal and social change. 10 Yet, concerns of selfgovernment, also a part of the civic republican position, 11 become
most exigent when appointed, life-tenured judges are assigned the task
of reading the Constitution to embody an affirmative theory of the
social good. This institutional concern is related to the second and
substantive barrier to change - the association of speculation about
the nature of the good life with the apocalyptic horsemen so often
decried by the liberal academic consensus: social hierarchy, elitism,
exclusivity, and authoritarianism. In balking at the authoritarianism,
the civic republican theorists reflect the strong appeal of liberal individualism; in balking at the elitism, the tug of liberal egalitarianism.
For these reasons, having moved the discussion from the extreme individualism of rights theories to a more communal stance, civic republican scholarship stops short of articulating the ends to which the
community should aspire, producing a theory accurately described re7. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1541.
8. This is a point I have made before. Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom and Bork: An Essay on the
Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 184-85 (1988) [hereinafter Hirshman,
Bronte; Bloom and Bork] (citing Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 918); Hirshman,
Foreword: Kicking Over the Traces of Self-Government, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 435, 443 (1988).
Sunstein's recent Standing and the Privatization of ~ublic Law, supra note 2, is typical in calling
for greater citizen involvement in decisionmaking, in this case of the important "fourth branch"
of government, but failing to articulate the goods that are to be sought in the review process.
Most recently, Sunstein has proposed the goals of "nonsubordination" and "risk management,''
as alternatives to the traditional ends of compensatory justice. Sunstein, The Limits of Compensatory Justice, (forthcoming in NoMos). Yet, even assuming that these phrases are stand-ins for
the values of equality and security, even equality and security are ultimately instrumental· to,
rather than definitional of, the good. See infra Part II.
9. See Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J, 1591-92, 1597-98, 1604 (1988). As
Professors Collins and Skover reminded us, in their timely and provocative essay, the publication
of which corresponded almost to the day with the fifth (of six possible) national electoral victory
of the representatives of American political conservatism, "Earl Warren is Dead." Collins &
Skover, supra note 3, at 189.
10. See Michelman, Traces ofSelf Government, supra note 2; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra
note 2, at 49-59, 86. Lately Sunstein has been moving away from this narrow focus. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 886, 891-92.
11. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1504; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, supra note 2.
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cently as "a muted hybrid."1 2
This· article attacks the barriers to articulation of a theory of the
good and advocates discussion of the substance of a good regime, specifically, a good American regime. 13 Part I of this article addresses in
some detail the civic republicans' revival of interest in the common
life. I propose that it is dauntingly difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a satisfying version of a common life without a theory of the
good life, an undertaking traditionally associated with authoritarianism and elitism. Rather than abandoning the enterprise, however, I
propose to reopen the assumption that the association automatically
rules out any undertaking. Toleration of some hierarchical ordering is
required in order to open the dialogue over the meaning of a good life.
Beginning with this assumption, I next assert that the classical vision
of personal and civic virtue 14 offers the best starting place for such a
discussion. 15 In addressing the American regime (although admittedly in the context of utopian speculation), I begin with the classical
virtue of liberality because it is the virtue most pertinent to the failings
of that regime.
The classical virtue of liberality is "the mean with regard to
wealth." 16 Liberality "resides ... in the state of character of the
12. Abrams, Law'.\- Republicanism, supra note 9, at 1591; see also Epstein, Modern Republi·
canism - Or the Flight from Substance, 91 YALE L.J. 1633 (1988); Fallon, What ls Republican·
ism, and ls It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1732 (1989); Lyons, Substance, Process
and Outcome in Constitutional Theory, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 763 (1987); Powell, Reviving
Republicanism, 91 YALE L.J. 1703, 1710 (1988); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent ConstitU·
tional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 154042 (1985).
13. Classical political philosophy differs from the modern because of its focus on the best
regime. Since Aristotle, political theorists have known that a dialogue over the best regime be·
gins with the participants' "primary concern" for their own regime. M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRA·
GlLITY OF GOODNESS 240-63 (1986); Pangle & Tarcov, Epilogue in HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 932 (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey 3d ed. 1987).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 64-70.
15. As political philosopher Leo Strauss put it, well before the current republican revival:
[D]emocracy is the regime that stands or falls by virtue: a democracy is a regime in which
all or most adults are men of virtue, and since virtue seems to require wisdom, a regime in
which all or most adults are virtuous and wise .... Democracy, in a word, is meant to be an
aristocracy which has broadened into a universal aristocracy.
L. STRAUSS, LIBERALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 4 (2d ed. 1989). The error in Strauss' indentification of adults as men is beyond the scope of this article. But see Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom
and Bork, supra note 8; s. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1990). As Strauss
students Thomas Pangle and Nathan Tarcov summed up recently, "[l]iberal democracy remains
a form of republicanism." Pangle & Tarcov, supra note 13, at 928.
16. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS IV.I at 79 (Ross trans. 1925) (World's Classics Paperback ed. 1980) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ETHICS]. In my references to the Politics and the
Nicomachean Ethics, I am deliberately forgoing the traditional citation to the Bekker edition of
the Greek text of Aristotle of 1831, which seem to me to be anachronistic at best and probably
affected as well. The Oxford paperback edition of the Ross translation of the Ethics is readily
available, as is the Oxford edition of the Barker Politics.
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giver," not in the amount of wealth he possesses. 17 The "liberal" man
possesses the habitual disposition to exercise moderation with regard
to money and property, a moderation amounting almost to indifference.18 He cares for money and property only to the extent that he
may have enough to exercise the active virtue of giving the right
amounts "to the right people, at the right time." 19
Part I contrasts classical liberality with the modem treatment of
distribution of wealth as a matter of right. In Part I, I show how each
of the two most influential modem theories - Kantian individualism
and utilitarianism - requires the giver to forgo distinctions among
recipients and that this neutral viewpoint leads to an impasse between
the demand for increasingly heroic behavior and the need for a cutoff
to heroism. The escape, I suggest, lies in the judgment and moderation that are aspects of classical virtue. In this case, the virtue of liberality makes it possible to choose among contenders for redistribution,
in the interest of a good common life.
Part II is an effort to apply the theoretical insights of Part I to the
American regime. In Part II, I address what, I think, most observers
of the American scene would agree is the nastiest contemporary
American problem: the persistence of the underclass. The problem
has two parts: it is a practical danger, and it reflects a failure of virtue,
in an Aristotelian sense. Part II contends that this failure of virtlle is
attributable in substantial part to the treatment of all redistribution of
wealth as a subset of modem distributive justice rather than as an independent virtue. As set forth below, American society, for historical,
social, and political reasons, 20 fails almost entirely to articulate redis- ·
tributive claims; the inability to make a claim of right for the underclass then closes the discussion. 21 This failure of rights analysis to
alleviate the plight of the underclass reached its high water mark in
the Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 22 rejecting a rights claim for equal funding of public
schools. Despite the best efforts of legal academics to squeeze some
redistributive claims into the language of the fourteenth amendment, 23
17. Id. at 81.
18. Id. at 36-40.
19. Id. at 79-82; see infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text. The use of the male pronoun
is after Aristotle, not this author.
20. J. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR?: AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
17, 20-21 (1981).
21. See infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
22. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL.
REV. 1 (1988); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term -Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
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the avenue of constitutional rights claims has remained firmly closed.
Further, even setting aside the issues of institutional competence and
textual fidelity that always muddy a constitutional claim, the weakness
of purely moral rights claims to redistribution has meant largely nonexistent or ineffective legislative solutions. 24 The problem of the
American underclass will never be solved unless analysts break the
stranglehold of rights analysis on modem political thought and consider the claims of virtue - an analytic frame in which decisions are
based at least in part on the moral well-being of the actor and the
society, and in which discrimination among claimants is a desirable
element of the virtue.
. In Part II, I suggest that the preferred application of liberality to
the problem of the underclass would be public, federal, and legislative.
Public, because the laws help habituate people to virtue and because
the virtue of liberality serves the common interest of social peace; federal, because, since the New Deal at least, social welfare has had a
primarily federal locus and education to virtue will be undermined if
people can easily avoid the laws; legislative, because the revival of the
virtue of liberality in a civic republican state should lie with the representative branch, which comes the closest to the direct exercise of virtue by the citizens themselves, and because implementing liberality
will require social and political judgments of some sensitivity that can
be tempered and refined in the legislative process. 25 Proposals for redistribution are never in short supply; this article concludes by simply
reminding the reader of two proposals afloat in the social science community for an impressive length of time: early childhood education
and broad-based programs of ideological, behavioral and economic
assistance for the estranged adults of the underclass.
I.

A.

THEORY

Community Without Virtue

Farber and Frickey tell us that legal scholarship is not only derivative, but, worse, takes up ideas from other disciplines just as they are
about to be rejected there. 26 Certainly, legal republican theorists readThrough the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Taylor & Brown, Equal Pro·
tection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700 (1986).
24. See infra Part 11.B.2.
25. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988); Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice: Foreword, 14 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988).
26. Farber & Frickey, supra note 2; see also Abrams, supra note 9.
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ily acknowledge their sources in other disciplines. 27 First, they draw
on the work of revisionist historians of the founding who purport to
find a strand of civic republicanism running from Machiavelli through
the English Whigs to the Framers. 28 This republican revival interprets
the founding as including the value of deliberative democracy with an
eye to a public or common good. This interpretation stands against
the traditional understanding of the founding as a purely Lockean
scheme for accommodating selfish or private interests.29
In addition to relying on a revised version of the American constitutional story, legal republicanism also draws on contemporary criticism of the extreme individualism of American liberal society, a
criticism that appears in a number of disciplines, including sociology,
philosophy, and political theory. 30 The philosophical criticism of liberalism asserts that people take their identities from social instit'utions
and social ends and that they desire to and can articulate a vision of
the good from that communal frame. 31 Theories, like John Rawls'
landmark A Theory of Justice, which set to the side those truths about
human nature in favor of constructing hypothetical individuals, rest
on a false notion of humanity and are thus philosophically flawed. 32
The sociological and political criticism asserts that, insofar as American society has evolved toward the_ liberal vision of human behavior, it
produces lives for its members that are alienated, stripped of meaning,
and devoid of significant human communities on every level, including
27. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1494 & nn.3-4 (citing J. APPLEBY,
CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s (1984); B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); F. MACDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985);
D. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL EcONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA
(1980); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography,
39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982); B. BARBER, supra note 2; HABITS OF THE HEART 28-31 &
passim; R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 2; A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2; c. TAYLOR, Kant's Theory
of Freedom, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 318
(1985); Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction ofEthics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291
(1985); Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986); Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self. 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984)).
28. See J. POCOCK, supra note 2; G. Wooo, supra note 2; cf. Shalhope, supra note 27 (discussing several historians' _approaches toward republicanism).
29. See T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 28 (1988); Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1540.
30. See supra note 27.
31. E.g., A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2, at 221 ("I find myself a part of history and that is
generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a
tradition.").
32. See Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 309-10
(1985).
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the level of politics. 3 3
In the years since the republican revival among historians, other
scholars have undertaken to rebut the purported rediscovery. 34 Regardless of whether historical republicanism turns out to be a minor or
major theme in the primal foundational myth, 35 the communitarian
critique of liberal philosophy and society, being rooted in several
strains of social theory, remains a viable and important development
in contemporary American thought. The communitarian critique is
compelling in part because it is but the most recent manifestation of
long-standing social and philosophical concerns with community and
the formation of communal values, a concern that reaches back at
least to Rousseau and Nietzsche. 36 As the heirs of Rousseau and
Nietzsche, the communitarians take their places as modern philosophers of the historicist school. They are modern, because, although
searching for moral meaning and a theory of the good, they eschew
the utopian speculation about the good life for humans and the best
political order traditionally associated with classical political theory. 37
Within the modern classification, as historicists, the communitarians
focus on human behavior in actual communities, rather than trying to
create hypothetical social organization to promote understanding. 38
Still, a concern with community does not necessarily compel either
modernism or historicism. As this article sets forth, the association of
a concern for community with distinctly pre-modern speculation on
the best life for human beings is certainly a well-established, indeed,
perhaps the oldest, tradition in political philosophy. 39 As will be more
33. See generally HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 2; B. Barber, supra note 2.
34. See J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); H. STORING, WHAT
THE ANTI-FEDERALIS'rS WERE FOR (1981); Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts,
43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1986); Appleby, The Social Origins ofAmerican Revolutionary Ideology,
64 J. AM. HIST. 935 (1977-78); Kerber, The Republican Ideology of the Revolutionary Generation, 31 AM. Q. 474 (1985); Powell, supra note 12.
35. As Sunstein properly notes, "History does not supply conceptions of political life that
can be applied mechanically to current problems." Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revfral,
supra note 2, at 1539; see also Hirshman, Brome; Bloom, and Bork, supra note 8, at 181-82
(describing the political rejection ofinterpretivism as espoused in J. ELY, supra note 4, at 43-44).
36. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 252-53 (1953).
37. Here I am self-consciously adopting Leo Strauss' position.
The classics understood the moral-political phenomena in the light of man's highest virtue
or perfection, the life of the philosopher or the contemplative life.... The new philosophy
takes its bearings by how men live as distinguished from how they ought to live; it despises
the concern with imagined republics and imagined principalities." L. STRAUSS, THOUGHTS
ON MACHIAVELLI 295-96 (1957).
3S. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 13-16 (describing the relation of historicism to theory
and actuality).
39. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 5 (E. Barker trans. 1946) ("(M]an is by nature
an animal intended to live in a polis.") [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, POLITICS].
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fully set forth below, 40 classical communitarianism differs from historicist communitarianism in linking the value of community ultimately
to human nature fa general, rather than focusing only on the particulars of historical or existing societies.41 Communitarianism, therefore,
is neither necessarily modern nor historicist. The contemporary communitarians, however, are both, and their theory has the strengths and
weaknesses of both.
As historicists, they have the strength of the unassailably gritty,
detailed, documented and compelling "tales" from real communities;42 compared to these concrete human experiences, the abstractions
necessary to the systems-building communitarians reject seem impov40. See infra text acco~panying notes 63-68.
41. Conversely, utilitarianism, a very theoretical and nonhistoricist theory about human systems, seeks the greatest good for the greatest number, producing results with a profoundly communitarian implication. See Fuller, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 24, at 714-15.
42. Probably the best stories are in Habits of the Heart. Here is an abridged version of one of
them:
·

Joe Gorman
•.. Joe has always lived in the small town where his father and mother have spent most
of their lives: Suffolk, Massachusetts, a community of fewer than 20,000 people, about a
half-hour's drive from Boston. Suffolk was founded 1632, and about six months before one
of us interviewed Joe Gorman, the town celebrated its 250th anniversary. Joe had taken
charge of organizing the celebrations, although he had not originally been asked to do so.
During the early phases of planning the anniversary festivities, the town manager appointed
a committee of locally prominent townspeople that did not include Joe. But the problem
was that practically none of its members had much experience in planning such a complicated event. To make matters worse, according to Joe, about half of them were more interested in getting their names in the paper than in doin_g much work. As a result, the first
event jn the long series of planned anniversary celebrations had been a fiasco - a large
community dinner with only enough food for about half of the people who showed up. Joe
Gorman knew that he had the ability to organize the celebrations successfully, and he felt a
kind of duty to do whatever he could to help. So he got himself on the committee and
became, in fact if not in name, its head.
·
Under Joe's direction, the anniversary celebration turned out to be a grand success. The
festivities stretched out for nine months. There were parades, concerts, a carnival, athletic
contests, dinners, dances and ecumenical religious services, all well attended and smoothly
organized. The fundamental meaning of the celebration was expressed for Joe in the slogan:
"We are doing it together." As he put it, "That's so important - to work to get as many
people as possible active." Another key theme was the importance of the family. The inspiration for many of the events came from the fact that that year had been proclaimed by the
United Nations to be "the year of the family." For Joe, the highlight of the festivities was a
softball tournament in which each team was made up of members of a different extended
family. "We had eight clans - eight big families from Suffolk-in the tournament. In one
of them some people came clear from Connecticut just to play softball on the side of the
family. You know, for me the best time of the whole celebration was standing there back
behind the bleachers after the softball games with members of the families that had played
and talking with them about their families and drinking champagne. That to me was the
ultimate. During the games between the clans, on many occasions, lots of people showed up
besides the players to watch the game and see how people in the families were doing."
HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 2, at 8-9. When feminist legal scholar Robin West went
searching for a richer model of humanity than the law and economics scholars imagined, she
found a universe of riches in the stories of Franz Kafka. See West, Authority, Autonomy, and
Choice, supra note 2. Similarly, in describing the concept of equal citizenship for women, Professor Karst said it, Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 2, at 1, 32, 57-59, but Hawthorne said it
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erished models of human conduct, indeed. But because shared notions
of the good life are limited to those held by the members of any particular community at any given time, historicism has the weakness of
being ultimately value-relative.43 More significantly, being modem as
well as historicist, contemporary communitarian theory lacks not only
a universal standard for the good life, but any relevant standard of the
good life, describing people merely as they are. Thus, although by
intuition and experience we may agree with the communitarians that
people derive their identities and satisfactions at least in part from
membership in a community, we are ultimately driven to ask why we
should care about a philosophy that instructs us to pursue ultimately
meaningless (but communal) activities any more than we should care
about the ultimately meaningless individualist goals of the theories the
communitarians attack.
Predictably, the introduction of lawyers onto the civic republican
scene has not changed the fundamental limits of the social and philosophical theory. As Richard Fallon has recently pointed out, the jurisprudential republican revival, operating as it does "at the border
between constitutional law and political theory" 44 has produced to
date a "watery"45 hybrid, which resembles liberalism almost as much
as it represents a new approach. 4 6
Thus, having spent several years trying to articulate a legal variant
of communitarian theory, the two leading advocates of republican jurisprudence remain arrested in a procedural stance. Frank
Michelman's most recent prescription, for an open and empathetic legislative and judicial dialogue that mimics the republican ideal of selfgovemance, founders on the Scylla of liberal criticism, that governmental dialogue, however elevated, inevitably culminates in coercion, 47 or the Charybdis, that "the concept can generate few
guarantees as to substantive outcomes. Who knows what conclusions
better. Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom and Bork, supra note 8, at 217·24 (describing citizenship in
Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter).
43. See Fishkin, Defending Equality: A View from the Cave (Book Review), 82 MICH. L.
REV. 755 (1984) (reviewing M. WALZER, supra note 2).
44. Fallon, supra note 12, at 1733.
45. Id. at 1734.
46. Id. at 1730-31 ("Michelman's republicanism overlaps importantly with familiar elements
of what would usually be regarded as the liberal tradition"; "Sunstein's republicanism .•• is
avowedly 'liberal.' He accepts, for example, that a just society would recognize rights elevated
above the debates characterizing ordinary politics, and he argues that the liberal commitment to
government neutrality ought to be upheld at least in modified form.").
47. See id. at 1728 ("Professor Cover's stark diagnosis rings all too true: in a morally and
politically pluralistic culture, losers in the judicial process ... commonly experience their defeats
as ~urispathic' - as destructive of law and moral rights as they view them ..•• ").
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might issue?"48 Cass Sunstein has, for some years, been honing a jurisprudential theory of community that uses judicial review of legislation to enforce a civic republican concept of rational deliberation to
reason toward the common good. 49 Here, too, however, without a
substantive conception of the good, the theory remains little more than
one of political good manners.
At this point, then, legal republicanism faces two problems: First, ·
the individualist habit of mind is a hard one to break. 50 Second,
although one might be willing and able to behave in an otherwise
unacceptably authoritarian fashion for some secure notion of the good,
the current republicans, being modern at bottom, claim to be agnostic
as to the good. 51 Thus, republican jurisprudence faces the same challenge as communitarian historicism: Why should we prefer an ultimately meaningless common enterprise to a meaningless individual
one? 52
An increasing body of legal and related scholarship has turned
once again to speculation about the good life for human beings. In
separate writings, Owen Fiss and Anthony Kronman have each pursued such inquiries, looking to the education, training and inclination
of lawyers as providing an opportunity for the exercise of -practical
wisdom in pursuit of a virtuous life. 53 Kronman undertakes to show
48. Id. at 1729.
49. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra
note 2, at 1579-81.
50. The conflict between autonomy and community is, of course, the sticking place. See
Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1501 ("self-government ... seems to express a
demand that we are aJJ bound to respect as a primal requirement of political freedom ... the
people's determination for themselves of the norms that are to govern their social life"); Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1554 ("The process of mediation is designed to
produce substantively correct outcomes ... through the ultimate criterion of agreement among
political equals."). It is evidence of the thin ether of republicanism that Professor Martha Minow's recognition that "some voices will lose," Minow, supra note 2, at 92, is treated as a tough
statement of political reality. And, compared to the "dangling conversation," Abrams, Law's
Republicanism, supra note 9, at 1599, of civic republican discourse, it is a tough statement.
51. See, e.g., Cass, The Perils ofPositive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative
First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987); Regan, Community and Justice in
Constitutional Theory, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1073 (1985); Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81
Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1986); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 1103, 1156 (1983); West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal
Vision, 46 U. PrIT. L. REV. 673 (1985); West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law,
supra note 2, at 543. Michelman put it more boldly. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note
2, at 1504 ("I do not know what is good for the soul."). I suppose Plato would be pleased at the
concern, anyway.
52. I am hardly the first to suggest that we should not. See, e.g., A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING
OF THE AMERICAN MIND 38-39 (1987); J. FISHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982); W.
GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 7, 14-53 (1980); M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS,
AND LAW (1988); L. STRAUSS, supra note 36.
53. Piss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Kronman, Living in the
Law, 54 u. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987).
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that the value of a "life in the law" is the opportunity to develop and
display "excellence of character";S4 his work thus tracks the most private aspect of the classical tradition, the development of personal virtue. ss Fiss makes a transition to a larger stage by asserting that such
character and tradition enables the judiciary to give meaning to our
public values at critical junctures:
In this account of adjudication I recognize that I am making an empirical assumption about the richness of the legal system in a country such
as the United States. I am assuming that our legal culture is sufficiently
developed and textured so as to yield a body of disciplining rules that
constrains judges and provides the standards for evaluating their work. S 6

Kronman's work is especially useful in reopening, in a modest context, the possibility of personal virtue as a general concept of the
human good. I want to take the discussion to a more ambitious level
by suggesting that the personal virtues Kronman and others invoke in
this limited sphere play a role in guiding the behavior of citizens on
the larger stage of the political community and ultimately shed light
on what a good community should be. In this undertaking, I am consciously, and, I hope, critically, disagreeing with Sunstein's position
that "modem republicans invoke civic virtue primarily in order to promote deliberation in the service of social justice, not to elevate the
character of the citizenry."s7 It will be my contention, although
hardly original, that the goal of social justice cannot be understood
absent a conception of the good life for human beings and the role of
the society in that life; the character of the citizenry is inextricably
intertwined with the larger social issues. ss
In returning the discussion to the good life for human beings and
the relationship between personal virtue and the public good, I consciously choose to engage in utopian political philosophy. Some years
ago, in his nee-Aristotelian treatment of the subject, political philosopher William Galston restated the arguments for such an undertaking:
Utopian thought performs three related political functions. First, it
guides our deliberation, whether in devising courses of action or in
choosing among exogenously defined alternatives with which we are confronted. Second, it justifies our actions; the grounds of action are reasons
that others ought to accept and - given openness and the freedom to
reflect - can be led to accept. Third, it serves as the basis for the evaluation of existing institutions and practices. The locus classicus is the Re54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Kronman, supra note 53, at 845-46.
Cf Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival supra note 2, at 1541 n.8.
Fiss, supra note 53, at 11.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1550-51.
See infra Part I.B.3 and text accompanying notes 286-92.
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public, in which the completed ideal is deployed in Plato's memorable
critique of imperfect regimes. 59

Galston also describes the characteristics of utopian thought that enable it to serve its purposes. "Utopias are images of ideal communities," whose purpose is to "make explicit and to justify the principles
on the basis of which such communities are held to be ideal." 60 Accordingly, utopias are intended to be universal; they arise out of our
experience but are not circumscribed by it; they are "cities of words,"
which may, but need not, exist, and they are constrained by the possibility of human and material preconditions neither illogical nor
impossible. 61
Now the enterprise of describing the good life for humans at all,
much less as the ends of political community, immediately runs up
against the objections set forth above: substantive notions of the good
life do not respect individual autonomy and equality. Instead they are
necessarily hierarchical, elevating certain behaviors and goals over
others, which may be of equal or greater value in the eyes of the individual life-planner. Moreover, notions of the good life frequently reflect the current power-holding elite, who project their class, race,
gender or other group "values" into universal truths. They are exclusive, in that the elite is usually exclusive, excluding people who do not
share the characteristics valued by the elite. Finally, they are either
selfish or totalitarian in that, insofar as each individual seeks personal
virtue, he or she separates from the community of free and equal individuals; on the other hand, trying to create a virtuous community involves imposing one's will on the same other autonomous beings. 62
Upon closer examination, this cavalry of objections may be less
formidable than it appears. First, the objection to a hierarchical ordering of human goals is greatly at odds with most peoples' experience
of their own and others' direction of their lives. Everyone knows you
can't have it all; ergo, all human lives involve ordering and therefore
hierarchy. So the objection is not to the act of order, but, rather, to
the act of imposing the order on other people. Thus, even if the vision
of the good life were correct, the contention is, freedom is more important than virtue, even if we could know it (which, by the way, is a
hierarchical ordering ranking autonomy over virtue).
The second line of argument asserts that, even if some lost freedom
59. W. GALSrON, supra note 52, at 14.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 15-16. There are other conditions, but these are the aspects material to this
undertaking.
62. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1540.
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were acceptable in exchange for a reliable version of the good life, the
order imposed may reflect the intellectual hegemony of the elite,
rather than an independently verifiable view of the good; in this worst
case, one would achieve neither freedom nor virtue. This objection is
certainly not without power. However, if the vision of the good is
wrong, the first problem - conflict between virtue and autonomy never arises. Accordingly, the objections from autonomy to any inquiry into the nature of the good, although not groundless, are at least
premature. If and when philosophy reveals a reliable view of the good,
the debate over communal avenues to that life may begin. Second, and
equally important, as the revival of communitarianism reflects, even in
America, autonomy has not always been trump. Instead, depending
on the context, an acceptable resolution of the competing claims of
virtue, in both its private and social roles, and ihdividual autonomy
may vary, and vary considerably.
Having thus tentatively justified the venture into utopian philosophy, I would begin with some of the principles developed by Aristotle.
Aristotle's ethical writings are enjoying renewed status in American
legal philosophy. 63 Writers and thinkers are once again willing to contemplate the possibility of a teleological explanation of human existence:64 that people's reason, particularly practical reason, may be the
quality of human life most productive of an understanding of human
ends; that the capacity to reason carries with it the unique capacity to
choose to order one's conduct among the claims of passion; and that
such choosing, if done well, leads to a life of activity in accordance
with virtue, which is the end, or goal, of human nature. 65
63. The most ambitious recent effort at confronting the nexus of law and Aristotelian virtue
is Brosnan, Virtue Ethics in a Perfectionist Theory ofLaw and Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 335
(1989). See also Francis, Virtue and the American Family (Book Review), 102 HARV. L. REV.
469, 480 (1987); Kronman, supra note 53; Solum, The Virtue and Vices of a Judge: An Aristote·
lian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988).
64. The teleological strain in several influential schools of contemporary legal philosophy
appears in the works themselves and in the readings of those works by other philosophers of law.
Thus, Roberto Unger's teleological thought in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975)
provides fuel for the analyses of his followers, e.g., Cornell, supra note 27, at. 340·41; Galston,
False Universality: Infinite Personality and Finite Existence in Unger's Politics, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 751, 754 (1987). Michael Perry's classical intellectual antecedents, M. PERRY, supra note
52, are the focus of Martin Shapiro's analysis in Shapiro, Morality and the Politics ofJudging, 63
TUL. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (1989). Teleological analyses have also surfaced recently in the context
ofa revived natural law approach, L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 7 (1987) ("The
argument of this book restores the original understanding of natural law as a theory about the
nature of being, the human condition in particular."), and feminist jurisprudence, Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminist Voice, supra note 2, at 543, 548.
65. The description of the role of virtue in ordering one's conduct among the claims of passion is very well presented in G. VON WRIGHT, THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS (1963). The
revival of virtue as an issue in legal philosophy has many strands. Most writers in legal journals
attribute the revival to the earlier revival of virtue ethics in philosophy and social science. See,
e.g., Francis, supra note 63, at 483 (Glendon draws on "the contemporary re-emergence of classi-
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The revived interest in Aristotelian concepts of personal virtue,
while valuable, stops short of the unanswered question of communitarian thought: what are the standards of a good common life? Yet here,
too, Aristotle's work offers answers. Although the world abounds
with writings about Aristotle's politics, the current jurisprudential neglect of the political writings warrants reiterating his basic principles
here. Aristotle wrote that the state must reinforce education with the
coercive power of the law if the whole world is to live in accordance
with virtue66 and that, in the pure realm of politics, the polis is necessary for a good human life, because it is the natural arena for the
uniquely human qualities of language and justice. 67 Critical to the detailed treatment of the virtue of liberality set forth below is the little
noted fact that Aristotle's polis depended in tum on the citizens' exercise of the virtues described in the Ethics:
The final end of men is the same whether they are acting individually or
acting collectively; and the standard followed by the best individual is
thus the same as the standard followed by the best political constitution .... The quality of courage and endurance is required for the activities of occupation: wisdom is required for those of leisure; temperance
and justice are qualiti~s required at both times ....68

The current fashion for Aristotle certainly does not justify simply
accepting his teachings, but the revival may indicate independent reasons for starting with them. First, the recent return to Aristotle's
writings on virtue reflects the persistence of the human need "to know
what we are doing and to be good." 69 For no matter how far philosophy has wandered from the Aristotelian beginnings, it has never been
able to cast loose. The classical project has the endurance we associate
with fundamental human concerns. Second, Aristotle's work, in contrast with that of the many who came after and the one who came
cal theories of virtue ethics"); Kronman, supra note 53, at 838 ("[I]t is my hope that what I say
will contribute to the current revival of interest in the question of what it means, more generally,
to live the life of a person, to have the cares and commitments, the character traits and dispositional attitudes, that give the lives of persons their distinctive shape.") (footnote omitted); Solum,
supra note 63, 1735 ("In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in Aristotelian moral
theory, and especially in Aristotle's theory of the virtues.") (footnote omitted). The revival appears in areas as divergent as the interpretation of the U.C.C., Patterson, Wittgenstein and the
Code: A Theory a/Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L.
REv .. 335, 339 n.14 (1988), and the law of criminal confessions, Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 739
(1988) ("[practical wisdom] is a translation of the Greek term, phronesis. Gadamer translates
phronesis as 'the virtue of thoughtful reflection' ").
66. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, X.9, at 272; see also Brosnan, supra note 63, at 34982 (how Jaw promotes virtue by habituation and internalization).
67. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 4-8.
68. Id. at 321.
69. A. BLOOM, supra note 52, at 238.
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before, has a mixture of the theoretical and the practical that is appealing in a time and culture that is not yet prepared to choose between
utopianism and modernism. Third, Aristotle's writings have a prudential and flexible quality that fits comfortably with other current
philosophical enterprises. 70 Assuming, therefore, that we can open a
discussion of virtue in American public life, what do Aristotle's writings add to an inquiry into the best American regime?
B. Liberality, Ancient and Modern

1. Ancient
I, for one, do not consider it a drawback that Aristotle's ethics
were the discussion of "qualities admired or disliked by the cultivated
Greeks of [his] time." 71 One is hard-pressed, 2500 years later, to come
up with aspects of the human character more promising for a desirable
personal or communal life than courage, temperance, liberality, munificence, pride, good temper, friendship, truthfulness, ready wit, and
justice.72
.
Maybe Aristotle was onto something.
Not surprisingly, within the vast body of Aristotle's work, modern
legal philosophy has focused on what Aristotle called justice in the
particular sense, "honour or money or safety" in the dealings with
one's neighbors, 73 rather than justice in the "wide" sense, "which answers to the whole of virtue." 74 There are several reasons for this.
First, modern legal philosophy separates and emphasizes the public
realm, 75 and, at least in the particular sense in which Aristotle used
the term, justice is the closest analogue, in classical philosophy, to a
purely public virtue. Second, Aristotle's categories of particular justice, distributive ("manifested in distributions of honour or money or
the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share
in the constitution") and rectificatory (concerned with "play[ing] a
70. Particularly legal philosophy, which, for example, seeks a common ground between tele·
ological and deontological philosophies. See L. WEINREB, supra note 64; Barnett, Foreword: Of
Chicken and Eggs- The Compatibility ofMoral Rights and Consequentialist Analyses. 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY. 611 (1989).
71. W. Ross, ARISTOTLE 202 (1923), quoted in
HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THE·
ORY 119 (2d ed. 1980).
72. W. HARDIE, supra note 71, at 118.
73. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 110.
74. Id. at 110-11.
75. Both feminists and republicans repeatedly make this point. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pri·
vacy v. Equality Beyond Roe v. Wade, reprinted in
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
(1987); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reforms, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2.

w.

c.
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rectifying part in transactions between man and man"), 76 fit comfortably with the rights-oriented theories of the last generation of legal
philosophy. 77
I believe, however, that legal, and thereby political, discourse has
been impoverished by the concentration on Aristotle's particularistic
justice, and that the time has come to cast off its hegemony openly. 78
Accordingly, I propose to mine other veins, equally rich, but somewhat less worked: Aristotle's writings - and those of others, of
course - on the virtues other than particular justice, beginning, in
this article, with liberality. 79
Aristotle saw liberality as one of the virtues pertaining to the use of
money. so The excesses are prodigality, an excess of giving, and meanness, which can take the form of either an excess of taking or a deficiency of giving. 81 (Since prodigality not accompanied by meanness
usually ends in poverty, Aristotle recognized that meanness is the
more common excess. 82) Being more interested in the ultimate uses of
wealth than in its acquisition, Aristotle focused on giving rather than
on refraining from wrongful taking. 83 The exercise of judgment in the
virtue of liberality comes by giving to "the right people, the right
amounts, and at the right time."8 4
There is surprisingly little commentary on this aspect of Aristotle's
writings. 8s While not all commentators agree that such virtues as lib76. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 111.
77. See Areen, A Need for Caring, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1067 n.47 (1988) (citing Seidman,
Public Principles and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of
Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1007 (1987)); Hardiwig, Should Women Think in Terms
of Rights?, 94 ETHICS 441, 447 (1984); Olsen, supra note 75; Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice, supra note 2, at 543, 564-65 n.98.
78. In making this proposal, I do not want to understate the contrast between liberality and
the traditional liberal world-view. As Judith Shklar has recently reminded us, the Kantian gentleman explicitly abjures "liberality or pity or noblesse oblige of any kind, because this might
humiliate the recipients." J. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 233 (1984).
79. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 79-85. In an ideal classical state, the law
would command virtuous conduct: therefore, to focus on the virtues other than particular justice
is to remain within justice in the broad sense. As Aristotle expressed it, "This form of justice,
then, is complete virtue ...." Id. at 108. But I am consciously choosing to redirect the discussion away from Aristotle's particular justice and, thus, as will be more fully set forth below, away
from the modern concept of justice, which follows Aristotle's narrower version.
80. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 79.
81. Id. at 82-84.
82. Id. at 83, 85.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id. at 80.
85. See, e.g., ARTICLES ON ARISTOTLE (J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji eds. 1979);
EssAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS (A. Rorty ed. 1980); D. ALLAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE (2d ed. 1970); W. HARDIE, supra note 71; G. VON WRIGHT, supra note 65. Of course, it
is difficult to search for what is not there. But see Cox, Aristotle and Machiavelli on Liberty, in
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erality are "nonmoral" 86 issues merely depicting contemporary social
taste, 87 commentators mainly discuss liberality for the light it sheds on
Aristotle's attitude toward private property. 88 In the recent The Crisis
of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective, 89 Professor Richard
Cox provides a summary of the general understanding of Aristotelian
liberality:· it "presupposes the existence of and even the rightness of
the private ownership of property," 90 and it consists of "a kind of sustained and extensive moderation of the underlying and fundamental
human passions," 91 thus making it, "in practice ... exceedingly difficult to make citizens liberal in the true sense of the term." 92
Nor is passion the only barrier to liberality. Focusing on Aristotle's requirement that "the liberal man will give property only to the
'right' people," 93 Cox concludes that "[r]efiection shows that the discrimination, the judgment, and the thoughtfulness required to separate
the virtuous from the vicious prospective recipients of one's largess
and to give only to the former make great demands on the moral and
intellectual character of the giver. " 94 Liberality involves, then, two of
the critical aspects of virtue: moderation and judgment.
The connection between the virtue ofliberality and the social order
is less clear. Because Aristotelian political philosophy generally assumes the identity of personal and political virtue, the state "exists ...
for the sake of a good life" 95 and a political system must preserve itself
by educating its citizens in the virtues that "support the best political
system." 96
Although Aristotle did not elaborate on the role of the particular
virtue of liberality in the public realm, the Politics reveals his assumptions about moderation in the pursuit of money and the objects of
moderation in its retention. For example, in describing the household,
Aristotle makes the point that wealth is limited to the resources neces-

w.

THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A STRAUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 125 (K. Deutsch &
Soffer eds. 1987).
86. Cf. w. Ross, ARISTOTLE 204 (1923).
87. Cf. id.
88. Irwin, Generosity and Property in Aristotle's Politics, Soc. PHIL. & POLY., Spring 1987, at
37 (1987); Miller, Aristotle on Property Rights (Mar. 1986) (paper delivered to the Society of
Ancient Greek Philosophers).
89. Cox, supra note 85, at 127.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 128.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 129.
95. ARISTOTLE, PoLmcs, supra note 39, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
96. Irwin, supra note 88, at 48; see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 332-33.
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sary for its subsistence. 97 He distinguishes the accumulation of wealth
obtained by trade, which is potentially unlimited,9 8 and concludes that
people pursue the accumulation of excessive wealth due to anxiety
about their livelihoods, an anxiety so great that they neglect their
moral well-being. 99 In response to this problem, Aristotle reiterates
the theme of moderation. Disputing Plato's scheme in the Republic of
common ownership of property, Aristotle distinguishes between the
love of money, which he accepts as universal, and the "excess" of such
love, which he condemns. Immediately thereafter, he reminds the
reader that the function of the form of goodness he calls liberality
"consists in the proper use which is made of property." 100
It is important to note that, while disagreeing with what he portrays as an impractical and extreme suggestion regarding the proper
allocation problem of property in Plato's Republic, Aristotle explicitly
and repeatedly relies upon the public enforcement of virtue in moderating the acquisitive passions. Thus, while acknowledging that there
may be social problems - of obsequiousness to the rich, for example,
and disputatiousness with one's neighbors - associated with private
property, 101 Aristotle proposes that "the present system [of private
property] would be far preferable [to communism], if it were adorned
by customs and by the enactment of proper laws." 102 As an "example"103 of such legislation, Aristotle refers to the Spartan law, providing that each citizen must donate a particular share of his property for
common meals. 104 In his favorable treatment of the Cretan constitution, Aristotle notes a similar, but superior, arrangement whereby
common meals are provided from publicly owned property. 105
Although Aristotle does not elaborate on other arrangements, his use
of the term "example" clearly implies the existence of other schemes
for legislation of liberality, serving the general purposes of social peace
and personal virtue through moderation of the excessive love of
money.
97. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 26.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 50.
101. Id. at 50-51.
102. Id. at 49.
103. Id. at 52.
104. Id. at 52, 82.
105. Id. at 52, 81-82.
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2. Modern

For our purposes, modern political philosophy diverges from the
classics in three important ways. Modern philosophy proposes the
separation of private virtue and political morality; modern philosophy
accepts the premise of man's imperfection; and modern philosophy
contemplates the commensurability of all individuals. In this section,
we will explore the fate of liberality in this modern context. The writings of John Locke reveal the metamorphosis of classical virtue under
the impact of the separation of private and public and the premise of
imperfection. The deontology of Immanuel Kant and the twentiethcentury debates over utilitarianism reflect the development of concepts
of altruism under the modern assumptions of imperfection and moral
equality.
John Locke may stand as the paradigmatic modern social contract
theorist. Although not the first, he is considered the most influential
thinker to have separated issues of personal virtue from political philosophy.106 Thus, in modern political philosophy, the personal virtue
of liberality loses its status as an integrated part of a whole concept of
justice. 107 This distinction separates the modern from the classical
treatment of liberality, because, in a classical utopia, whose end is to
promote the good life for human beings, the virtues are all encompassed in the broad justice of obedience to the laws of a good state. 108
In Locke's construct, a main nonpolitical source of moral direction
is religion, and, although it is not Locke the theologian who is of interest here, one may note with Locke scholar Thomas Pangle that Locke
appears to convert the traditional notion of charity as a duty of the
giver into a very modern claim of right belonging to the subject. 109
Having noted the separation of the personal virtue from the political
question of distributive justice, the remaining question is what Locke's
redistributive intent was.
Here, there is much debate, largely centering on the so-called
Lockean "proviso" that acquisitive individuals in the state of nature
106. L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 68-69 (Hobbesian rejection of classical unity); id. at 178
(Machiavellian rejection of classical utopianism); id. at 213 n.63 (separation of virtue and public
pursuit of happiness); id. at 221 n.82 (Locke, a follower of Hobbes, replaces love and charity with
refraining from harm);.c.f. c. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE lNDIVID·
UALISM 1, 3 (1962).
107. See T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 144, 169, 306 n.2.
108. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 107-08.
109. T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 144, 306 n.2; cf. R. AsHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE'S Two Treatises of Government 272 n.186 (1986). Although Pangle indicates a
disagreement with respected Locke commentator Richard Ashcraft regarding whether Locke's
charity is a duty or a right, both agree on its limited scope.
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must leave behind "enough and as good" quality as that taken. 110 At
one extreme, Leo Strauss and C.B. MacPherson assert that the proviso
does not survive the state of nature; thus, the right to appropriation of
property in civil society is unlimited. 111 At the other, John Dunn
states a generous conception of the ongoing right - to a "sufficient
and commodious living." 112 Dunn has staked out the far ground;
most discussion assumes a far less generous reading of Locke. Focusing on the whole sweep of his writings, rather than on an isolated passage, most commentators agree that the Lockean rights-claim to
redistribution is limited to little more than subsistence, based on the
natural right to life, with strict disincentives for laziness and
improvidence. 11 3
A passage in Locke's less well-known writings supports this limited commitment to redistribution. Locke unexpectedly raises the subject of liberality (even using the classical term) in his essay, "Some
Thoughts Concerning Education." 114 There, he advises the reader to
teach children "to part with what they have, easily and freely to their
friends." 115 The interesting part of Locke's essay is that, in direct contrast to the classical teaching of liberality as an antidote to excessive
attachment to property, Locke advises parents to "constantly tak[e]
care that [the child] loses nothing by his liberality. Let all the instances he gives of such freeness be always repaid, and with interest;
and let him sensibly perceive that the kindness he shows to others is no
ill husbandry for himself." 116 Thus, rather than inculcating a detachment from gain, Locke would use long-term attachment to gain to
generate desirable short-term public behavior.
The distance between Locke's world and the world of classical philosophy lengthens in his reasons for the desirability of a liberal character. For Locke, liberality has no inherent value; instead, by
inculcating a pattern of liberal behavior early, the parent prepares the
child to forgo the more serious mistake of injustice: "But because chil110.
111.
112.
(1988).
113.

J. LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT§ 27 (1947).
L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 239-46;

c.

MACPHERSON, supra note 106, at 211-14.

Dunn, Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's Political Theory, 16 POL. STUD. 68, 82

See, e.g., R. AsHCRAFT, supra note 109, at 272-73; R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 174-82;
T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 169-70; J. TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE
AND His ADVERSARIES 131-39, 166 (1980); Rose, ''Enough. and as Good" of What?, 81 Nw.
L. REV. 417 (1987); Stick, Turning Rawls into Nozick and Back Again, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 390

u.

n. 140 (1987).
114. J. LOCKE, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in JOHN LOCKE ON EDUCATION (P.
Gay ed. 1964).
115. Id. at 83.
116. Id. at 83.
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dren cannot well comprehend what injustice is, till they understand
property, and how particular persons come by it, the safest way to
secure honesty, is to lay the foundations for it early in liberality ..... " 117 What is this injustice Locke is so anxious to avoid?
"[P]ossessing themselves unjustly of what is another's, whilst there are
in the world stronger and more men than they." 118 Thus, liberality in
Locke's world is nothing more than the preparation for participation
in the Lockean regime of property. 119 Liberality for Locke ceases to
be a virtue in an Aristotelian sense - that is, a way of being that is
good in and of itself and essential among the citizens of the good
regime.
A second source of modem thought on the subject may be traced
to Immanuel Kant. Like Locke, in discussing charity, or altruism to use another modem term - Kant did not expressly concern himself
with the issue of public versus private morality. Also as in Locke,
issues of altruism were not particularly prominent in Kant's work.
However, Kant's signal contribution to moral philosophy - the categorical imperative of moral behavior - and his fourth illustration of
the imperative do speak directly to the question. The categorical imperative - that people must "act only on a maxim by which you can
will that it, at the same time, should become a general law" 120 - dictates that we must exercise benevolence in anticipation of the occasion
when we may anticipate needing similar treatment. 121 Thus, Kant's
treatment of altruism reflects the modem vision of man as having a
limited capacity for virtue and sharing equally in a self-centered, but
egalitarian, uniformity of rights and duties.
The third and final source of modem political philosophy - utilitarianism - reintroduces many of the issues of classical liberality.
First, utilitarianism, while coexisting with a largely Lockean view of
the state, is not inherently a philosophy of limited government. In
fact, limited government is necessary only in one variant, which assumes that the invisible hand of wealth maximization would produce
utilitarianism's goal of the greatest good for the greatest number.1 22 If
117. Id. at 84.
118. Id. at 85.
119. I am grateful to Professor Carol Rose for introducing me to the communitarian implicn·
tions of participating in the Lockean regime. See C. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives
from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 37 (1990).
120. I. KANT, Metaphysical Foundations of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 172 (C.
Friedrich ed. 1949) (emphasis omitted).
121. Id.
122. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA·
TION 288-89 (J. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970); 8 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
13 (1966); Fuller, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,
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government action were required for the utilitarian goal, utilitarianism
would support such action. Thus, utilitarianism, like classical political
theory, contemplates, at least, a much more expansive official
sphere.123 Second, in the period of utilitarian hegemony, most moral
philosophers did not distinguish benevolence or charity, but accepted
a simple scheme for acts of moral significance consisting of duty, prohibition, and permission and developed a catalogue of duties and
prohibitions designed to produce the desired good effects. 124 In this
exercise, utilitarianism suffered from its inability to draw coherent
lines around duty, or between giver and recipient. If every action
must be judged against a duty to produce the greatest good, any distribution has moral consequences, which makes it very difficult to make
judgments. 125
About a generation ago, in a development interestingly parallelling
the legal positivism debate, 126 philosophers began to chafe under the
inadequacy of the utilitarian categories to account for desirable behavior not amounting to an enforceable127 duty. In an influential little
article, "Saints and Heroes," moral philosopher J.0. Urmson attacked
this longstanding classification as "totally inadequate to the facts of
morality" 128 because it does not account for acts of supererogatory
saintliness and heroism, which, while far beyond "duty" as commonly
understood, are entitled to some moral recognition beyond the thin
title of "permission." As Urmson put it,
[W]e need to discover some theory that will allow for both absolute duties, which ... can be exacted from a man like a debt, to omit which is to
do wrong and to deserve censure, and which may be embodied in formal
rules or principles, and also for a range of actions which are of moral
value and which an agent may feel called upon to perform, but which
supra note 13, at 710, 723-24; Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769 (1985).
123. The current debate over the intrusiveness of utilitarianism goes back at least to the
Smart/Williams debate in the early 1970s. See J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM
FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
124. See Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in MORAL CONCEPTS 60, 67-68 (J. Feinberg ed. 1969).
125. Cf id. at 71.
126. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
(1958).
127. By enforceable, many modem philosophers adopt Mill's simile: one should be able to
exact performance "as one exacts a debt." J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 60 (1948); see J. FEINBERG, Supererogation and Rules, in DOING AND DESERVING 6 (1970). In Supererogation, Feinberg made the traditional positivist distinction between moral enforceability and legal
enforceability, the latter involving "civil liability or criminal punishment for nonperformance."

Id.
128. Urmson, supra note 124, at 60.
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cannot be demanded and whose omission cannot be called wrongdoing.129
In attempting to articulate a new terminology, Urmson referred
back to the utilitarian debate that was his immediate intellectual backdrop. He noted that those acts the utilitarians detailed in attempting
to describe the ultimate good for their theory - characteristics like
promise-keeping, abstinence from murder, theft, and the like - actually had in common a more modest characteristic: they were the minimum qualities necessary for people to live together in society. 130 Here,
he thinks, lay a possible insight into a new scheme of duty, including
both those minimum requirements for living together, and actions beyond duty, like heroism and saintliness, which, while more elevated
than permission, could not be exacted.131
Anticipating the criticism that his scheme lacked a certain moral
ambition, Urmson defended it on the grounds that a modest moral
scheme would help people as they actually are or reasonably can become, rather than overreaching in the name of an ideal and failing,
with the predictable consequence of promoting relativism. 132 Unlike
more demanding schemes of moral value, Urmson's sphere of moral
duties would give a special status to those matters where universal
compliance is at a premium; his duties would be within the realm of
normal human capacity, "formulable in rules of manageable complexity,"133 and formulated in terms of enforceable rules. 134
Not surprisingly, contemporary political theory, heavily influenced
by Rawls' emphasis on generally applicable rules of social organization, focuses on defining duties - in Urmson's terminology, the acts
we owe to each other simply because of a common membership in
society. Each of the major sources of modern political theory is represented in the contemporary debate. The scheme of minimal duties associated with the traditional reading of John Locke appears in
Anarchy, State and Utopia, where Robert Nozick asserts that the only
justifiable state is the minimal state, protecting its citizens against
force and fraud in the form of "boundary crossings" against existing
129. Id. at 67.
130. Id. at 67-68.
131. Id. at 68.
132. Id. at 69-72.
133. Id. at 70.
134. Id. at 70-73. Although Urmson, like most of the philosophers in this area, was frustrat·
ingly silent on the obviously relevant legal positivism/natural law debate, his characterization of
a modest sphere of moral duty sounds amazingly like Lon Fuller's recitation of the internal
morality of law - the achievement of rules that are predictable, within human capacity, and
stable. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41-44 (1964).
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holdings. Although in a universe encompassing more than just the
political sphere, moral claims may arise beyond this jural sphere of
rights, Anarchy, State and Utopia is devoid of any reference to moral
obligations beyond rights; hence, one may assume that no general requirement of even minimal scope exists in this theory. 135 By contrast,
Rawls expresses an explicit - if somewhat laconic - version of what
he calls "mutual aid." 136 As free and equal moral persons, he posits,
we owe each other a "natural duty," which attaches without agreements, that, if we can help each other without excessive risk, we
should do so. 137 Rawls justifies this principle on the watered down
Kantian grounds that such benevolence would have a pervasive essential effect on everyday life, knowing that we live in a society where we
can depend on each other. 138
Like Urmson, Rawls explicitly asserts the superiority of his theory
to classical utilitarianism on the grounds that it provides a line between moral duties and supererogatory acts. 139 By contrast, a contemporary utilitarian, Peter Singer, embraces the heroic implications of
utilitarianism, asserting that utilitarianism requires that, "if it is in our
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally,
to do it." 140 As Singer recognizes, "the revision in our moral conceptual scheme ... would, given the extent of both affi.uence and famine
in the world today, have radical implications." 141 And, as Singer also
recognizes, the biggest change will be where the line is drawn between
duty and charity, 142 which, in Singer's scheme, will entail "giv[ing]
until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at
which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or
my dependents as I would relieve by my gift."143
I sure wouldn't want to live in Singer's world, and Fishkin has
even written a book to explain why not. 144 Singer's theory, according
to Fishkin, violates at least two fundamental intuitions about the basic
structure of individual morality: first, that there is a "cutoff for heroism - the notion that there are limits on what any other person can
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

This is Fishkin's reading of Nozick. J. FlSHKlN, supra note 52, at 68-69.
J. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 114.
Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 117.
Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 229, 231 (1972).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 241.
J. FISHKJN, supra note 52.
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demand of us as a matter of duty or obligation" 145 and, second, a
"[r]obust [z]one of [i]ndifference: a substantial proportion of any individual's actions falls appropriately within the zone of indifference or
permissibly free personal choice."146
Fishkin's insight into Singer's theory would seem to send most
thinkers running to the shelter of Rawls' self-proclaimed limited altruism. But, according to Fishkin, even under Rawls' minimal formula,
heroic sacrifice of Singer's type would ultimately be required. 147 First,
all positions of neutral viewpoint mandate a formula of general
obligation:
If we love our neighbors as we love ourselves, we are inexorably led to
the admission of at least some positive, general obligations.... From any
of [the neutral] perspectives, some principles of general obligation seem
undeniable. How would one argue against the principle of minimal altruism [obligation to save a human life, if the cost is minor], for example,
from such a perspective? If I have to consider whether to save a starving
refugee at minor cost to myself, after I have put myself realistically in
the shoes of the starving refugee, any reasonable calculation of the interests at stake will lead me to conform to the obligation. 148

Rawls' version of neutrality does not escape the theoretical compulsion to admit general obligations:
I am to imagine myself choosing a moral principle out of self-interest
from behind a "veil of ignorance" which, according to Rawls, makes it
rational for me to take seriously the possibility that I will occupy the
worst position. Clearly, I will wish to choose principles that ensure my
survival and (at least) minimal well-being. The prospect of becoming a
starving refugee provides a clear motivation for requiring substantial sacrifices from those who tum out to occupy the more fortunate positions.
It should be obvious that a principle of redistribution far more demanding than minimal altruism would be chosen in the original position. Yet
even minimal altruism is sufficiently demanding, at the large scale, to
produce our dilemma. 149

Thus, any altruism above Nozick's zero altruism slides inexorably into
Singer-like self-sacrifice:
If every small contribution to famine relief will save a human life or
prevent other serious harm ... then I am obligated by the principle of
minimal altruism to give - and to continue giving - until the marginal
sacrifice involved in any individual act of giving is more than minor.
The disparity in affluence between the developed countries and the
world's poor is so enormous that an American citizen of average means
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

7.
23.
159.
34 (emphasis in original).
159 (footnote omitted).
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. . . could give half his income - and it would still be the case that an
additional small contribution would be a minor sacrifice. If I were reduced to half my present (junior faculty) salary, I could still afford to
give five more dollars. 150
Yet so inconsistent is this re.suit with our existing intuitions about the
limits of self-sacrifice that Fishkin feels obliged to conclude:
[T]hese difficulties pose a challenge that is aim.ed more squarely at liberalism than at other ideologies and moral positions. To give up either the
general obligations that are rooted in impartiality or the limits on moral
requirements that are presupposed by individualism would represent a
very great revision in liberal assumptions as well as in the way most of us
think and act with respect to moral questions. Some great revision in
our assumptions or in our action is required. 151

The Virtue Connection
Well, it's an imperfect world. 152 And therein, I assert, lies the answer to Fishkin's dilemma. While neutral viewpoints may illuminate a
piece of the path toward a good life, they just do not light the whole
way. 153 Neutral viewpoint philosophy having failed to solve the problem of altruism, either the neutrality or the altruism must be abandoned. Nozick presents us with a vision of a world without charity; 154
having rejected that vision, we are left essentially with the classical
world of nonneutrality.
In an influential response to Urmson, contemporary philosopher
Joel Feinberg has opened an avenue that may prove fruitful. 155 Feinberg would replace Urmson's scheme of spheres of duty and spheres
beyond duty into a more neutral division of duty and nonduty, the
latter being all acts not required, even those acts bearing no relationship to the acts that are required. Feinberg describes the acts of saintliness or heroism that inspired Urmson's attack on the earlier moral
scheme as nonduties, involving excessive sacrifice, but, most significantly, distinct because also involving moral worth or praiseworthiness.156 Feinberg gives several examples to illustrate the role of the
distinction of moral worth; the most graphic is "the greedy adventurer
3.

150. Id. at 72 (emphasis omitted).
151. Id. at 171 (emphasis omitted).
152. Id. at 161 & n.9. Cf. McGuire, The Calculus ofMoral Obligation, 95 ETHICS 199, 199200, 223 (1985) (altruism must factor in group behavior, which factor affects the linearity and
equivalence of Fishkin's theory).
153. See Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY. 625 (1988) (arguing that communal bonds are not strong enough to hold our society
together, and thus we need rights to "fall back on" in failed relationships).
154. J. FISHKJN, supra note 52, at 68.
155. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 127.
156. See id. at 12-13.
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who sets off on an arduous journey into the heart of the jungle/' 15 7
Such an action is not a duty under anyone's scheme and certainly
sounds excessively hard; nonetheless, the adventurer's journey is not
something we would consider saintly or heroic, because the critical
third element - moral worth - is missing.
In grappling with this core issue of moral worth, Feinberg makes a
distinction that bears directly on the tough, but seemingly unavoidable, task of choosing avenues of liberality. First, there is an "institutional complex" of concepts of merit, which
.
consists. of (1) essentially jural or institutionally connected rules which
enjoin, permit, and prohibit, and thus impose duties and obligations, and
(2) other rules which prescribe procedures for determining merits and
demerits [i]n such institutions ... in which behavior is in part governed
by such rules and regulations. 15 8

But Feinberg is more interested in "a quite different conception of personal merit and a quite distinct sort of rule." 159 Here "we are concerned with a person's merit or worth, not merely in respect to this or
that job or office, skill, or function, but 'in the last analysis,' all things
considered. " 160 In order to make this calculation, Feinberg assumes
that "there must be some special job of a man as such, so that being
good at that job confers final, overall worth." 161 Well, you knew it
had to be in here somewhere: "Man is by nature an animal intended
to live in a polis, " 162 and judgments about acts of moral worth may be
made based on what is necessary for a citizen of a good society in
order to fulfill his nature.
Thus Feinberg, vocal defender of liberalism, articulates something
very close to the classical formulation. The Aristotelian vision was of
a unity of private and public virtue. The virtuous man, exercising
moderation over his passion for money, is fulfilling not only his own
nature, but also fits into the need for public peace and for a regime in
which the middle class predominates. 163 This "good" society places
us squarely between Urmson's minimal social world and Singer's millenarian vision, or, to borrow another locution, between "thin democracy" 164 and a smothering authoritarianism.
157. See id. at 12.
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at 15.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 19.
162. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 5.
163. Id. at 181-83.
164. The locution is Barber's. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, passim. Barber analyzes American liberal democracy as inadequately oriented toward public participation.
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In this good society, the exercise of liberality will serve three purposes which modern distributive justice cannot meet: First, where
claims of desert do not extend much beyond that necessary for minimal social peace, 165 yet pressing needs exist beyond the recognized
claims of desert to distributive justice, the exercise of the virtue of liberality may fill the gap. Second, in a good society, there is necessarily
an arena for behavior that falls far short of the ideal. In the area of
redistribution, such actions can be experimental,- or simply insufficient.166 Yet, modern distributive justice always focuses on perfection:
a state of nature, a social compact, a veil of ignorance, all so that perfect equity pertains in all social arrangements. Liberality side-steps
these utopian barriers to entry. Third, since Hobbes, and certainly
since Rawls, political philosophy has focused so intently on the lowest
common denominator of society that it has forgotten the interest of
the fortunate in a life of virtue. 167 Liberality enables those-capable of
virtue to use their reason, inter alia, to select recipients of welfare, a
decision not permitted by the perfect exigencies of rights-based claims
at either extreme.16s
In sum, there is no shortage of candidates for the elements of the
good life - for individuals or for societies. As a first step in examining some of these candidates, I have suggested the classical virtue of
liberality: the vision of a society of citizens, moderate in their passion
for property and enjoying some of the social fruits of peace and stability while avoiding the floodgates implications of modern altruism.
Having made out the general claim for the virtue, I turn, in the next
section, to the role of liberality in the American regime.

II.

THE NATURE OF THE REGIME169

The American economic system alone may have never developed
As a result, peoples' lives lack the discipline of communal dialogue, and political society Jacks
resistance to totalitarian truth. Id. at 24-25.
165. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 20,passim (Americans do not typically support significant redistributions of wealth); J. PATIERSON, AMERICAN'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY
1900-1985 (1986), passim (same); L. KOMISAR, DOWN AND OUT IN THE USA (1974), passim
(same).
166. Graham, Justice, Charity and the Third World, 311 MODERN THEOLOGY 21, 29-30
(1986).
167. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 15, at ch. 1; L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 168-69.
168. See Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 446
(1987) ("The difference principle is founded in rationality and reciprocal advantage, not in sympathy and benevolence.").
169. The regime is an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices, particularly the one
that has authority over all matters. For what has authority in the city is everywhere the
governing body, and the governing body is the regime. As Aristotle makes clear at the
outset of his discussion, while the regime is in the first instance an institutional arrangement,
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into a state of fatal inconsistency with republican political ideals without the addition of the "poison" 170 of black slavery. Today's reality is,
however, that race and poverty together have produced one of the few
social developments (the others being, for instance, aristocratic titles
and military dictatorship 171 ) inconsistent with even a minimal concept
of a republican government: a permanent underclass, cut off by walls
of discrimination, illiteracy, hopeles~ness, and, perhaps worst, lack of
education for participation in the community. 172 The thesis of this
Part is that the persistence of this social development - radically inconsistent with minimum notions of republican politics - demonstrates the impossibility of separating, as the civic republicans seem to
attempt, social justice from the character of the citizens.
A. Background
We Americans really love our money. 173 Apparently we always
did. 174 As a commentator of the Jacksonian era expressed it, "In the
United States the pride of wealth has more force than in any other
country because there is here no other pride to divide the human
heart."175
On the other hand, the civic republican historians have pointed up
an equally respectable American tradition, which tended to regard
property as instrumental to the virtue of republican self-governance.
A man could not be a citizen, this line of thinking went, if he did not
the regime cannot be properly understood in institutional terms alone. The regime reflects
more fundamental political realities - the relationships of authority and subordination
between the different groups that make up the city. For all practical purposes, the
politically dominant class - the "governing body" (politeuma) - is the regime.
Lord, Aristotle, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 139 (citation omitted).
170. Gest, Civil·Rights Drive Shifts to Low Gear, U.S. News & World Report, July 2, 1984, at
27.
171. See
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF TIIE
CONSTITUTION 11 (1972).
172. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY (G. Jaynes & R. Williams
eds. 1989); w. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 8 (1987); Auletta, The Underclass (pts.
1-3), NEW YORKER, Nov. 16, 1981, at 63, Nov. 23, 1981, at 72, Nov. 30, 1981, at 101; Edelman,
supra note 23; Karst, supra note 23; McLanahan & Garfinkel, Single Mothers and Social Policy,
501 ANNALS 92, 93-94 & nn.5, 6, 8 (1989); Wacquant & Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class
Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 ANNALS 8 (1989); Chicago on Hold: The New Politics ofPoverty
(pts. 1-5), Chi. Tribune, Aug. 29, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Aug. 30, 1988, § 1, at 2, col. I; Sept. I,
1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Sept. 2, 1988, § 1, at l, col. 2; Sept. 4, 1988, § l, at I, col. 3. See generally
The Ghetto Underclass: Social Sciences Perspectives, 501 ANNALS (1989) (symposium on the
underclass).
173. This should hardly require an authority, but should something be helpful, see T.
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1988). Some people even think we wrote the Constitution to protect it, c. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
174. See T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 93.
175. J. DIGGINS, supra note 34, at 145 (1984) (quoting w. GOUGE, A SHORT HISTORY OF
PAPER MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 30-33 (1833)),

w.

u. s.
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have enough property to provide for his needs; if he were a "slave" in
his economic relations with other men. 176 But two at least potentially
inconsistent conclusions flow from this argument. Property holdings
must be secure. But holdings must be relatively equal. 177
The Framers hoped that they had solved the worst of the equality
problem with the abolition of entail and primogeniture. 178 However,
under the relentless dynamic of capitalism, it early became clear to
them that they had not; secure property would ever tend to inequality
and inequality would, in turn, be the source of that threat to the common good: faction. Facing Shays' rebellion, Madison wrote that only
a minority "can be interested in preserving the rights of property." 179
Madison's writings, at least, leave little doubt that he found the solution in size - the large republic would produce a multitude of factions, none dominant; the large government would produce a
multitude of governors, similarly situated. 180 The size of the American continent would enable the Framers to "reconcile republicanism
with reality" 181 by the endless availability of western lands.
The ensuing two centuries reflect the enduring tension between the
sanctity and equality of property. There is certainly evidence of separatism, consigning property and the social relationships it affects to the
private realm, by, for example, eliminating property qualifications for
acts of citizenship, like voting. By depriving property of its currency
in the realm of citizenship, separatism attempts to reconcile the conflict between republican demands for wealth-based independence and
the liberal concept of men as inherently free and self-governing. 18 2
One might guess that the separation of property from citizenship
would have worked both ways, protecting property from all incursions
from the state, as well as protecting citizenship from claims of superior
wealth, thus creating a kind of pre-political or extra-political realm
immune from politics. 183 Such a simple strategy, however, never pre176. L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION 51 (1978); D. McCOY, supra note 27, at
68; F. McDONALD, supra note 27, at 74-75; Historical Introduction to THE POLITICAL WORKS
OF JAMES HARRINGTON 54 (J. Pocock ed. 1977); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 467, 470, 475 (1976); Michelman, Possession,
supra note 2, at 1329 n.60 (citing D. McCOY, supra note 27, at 60-62, 67-69, 126-27); Steinfeld,
Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 338 (1989); Note,
Land Reform and Corporate Redistribution: The Republican Legacy, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1229,
1232-3~ nn.21-23 (1987); J. PococK, supra note 2, at 391.
177. G. WooD, supra note 2, at 410-11; Note, supra note 176, at 1232-33 nn.21-23.
178. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 410-11.
179. Id. at 411..
180. THE FEDERl\LIST No. 10, at 82-83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
181. Note, supra note 176, at 1235.
182. See Steinfeld, supra note 176.
183. Michelman, Possession, supra note 2, at 1330-31.
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vailed. Early police power cases reflect the old and deep roots of property's vulnerability to claims of the common good. 184 The
development of the corporate form in the late nineteenth century produced a second kind of claim on politics - to curb the resulting unprecedented aggregations of wealth and power. In order to justify
invoking the power of the state in the private sphere, the Progressives
had to and did reforge the link between politics and property, focusing
this time on the political nature of nongovernmental power relationships.185 Because the federal courts resisted some of the progressive
incursions on property, only after the acceptance of the New Deal did
the American political system largely accept the communal claims on
private property. 186
B.

The Poor

The treatment of the poorest members of society, the actual paupers, reflects the diversity of American attitudes toward property as
well as its own brand of complexity. From the standpoint of formal
citizenship, even as the franchise was broadened through taxpayer requirements or, later, poll taxes, to include workers with a property in
their labor rather than in capital, paupers were affirmatively and deliberately excluded from voting. 187 Even the partial inclusion of the
poorest Americans into the category of voters, if not citizens, 188 really
only took effect with the enactment of the Voting Rights Act twentyfive years ago. 189 Thus, at the extreme of pauperism,. the republican
conflict between property and citizenship was, for a time at least, subject to an exclusionary solution not applied to anyone else. 190

. 1. Relief
Turning to the converse issue - the use of public resources to alleviate poverty - I am tempted to achieve academic immortality as the
first scholar to write about paupers without opening with the quote
184. Harry Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government,
1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1988) (summarizing the
developments, many of which Scheiber drew together in other works).
185. Michelman, Possession, supra note 2, at 1334-36.
186. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Rediscovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1052-57 (1984); Nichol, Children ofDistant Fathers; Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1337. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 903.
187. See Steinfeld, supra note 176, at 335-36.
188. For a description of the distinction between citizenship and voting, see B. BARBER,
supra note 2. But see K. KARST, .BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 93-94.
189. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l (1982)).
190. See Michelman, Possession supra note 2, at 1331.
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from Jesus ("The poor are always with us"). Here, however, it's not
only the beginning, but probably the whole story. Certainly, the poor
have always been with us. First, the capacity of mankind to provide
has only recently, in historical time, begun to approach a level adequate to sustain most people at some objective level of comfort, if not
luxury. 191 Second, even if one limits one's self to a specific society,
say, the United States, with adequate supplies, the political problem of
redistribution to offset poverty is a devilishly tough one. Finally, as
general supplies become more abundant, the idea of what constitutes
poverty rises, so that even a society committed to raising its poorest
members is chasing a moving target.192
For a long time, the United States, like the rest of the world, was
hemmed in by scarcity, so that the second and third problems were
mostly hypothetical. 193 People were poor; perhaps as many as half the
people lived at a level of absolute poverty. 194 When the poverty
reached the level of pauperism, the towns offered alms houses, whose
residents were expected to work for the town. 195 With the ultimate
reality of poverty largely beyond reach, the charitable donors were free
to discriminate among recipients. The focus was traditionally some
variation of moral worth - for the churches, spiritual, for the towns,
that life on welfare should be "less eligible [less desirable] than life
enhanced by work."196
To a surprising extent, these attitudes survived well into the industrial period, when the prospect of more generalized relief from poverty
began to appear. The Progressives talked about environmental causes
of poverty, but their prescriptions were largely directed not at alleviating the hardship directly, but, rather, at turning the poor into good
members of the middle class by inculcating them with the work ethic.
The movement toward providing pensions to mothers with dependent
children - a world away from turning the women into workers 197 still avoided confronting the prospect of simple relief by limiting the
recipients to the "deserving" - largely widows, who would otherwise
have been reduced to alms houses.19s
One would have thought that the poverty of the Great Depression,
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 9-10, 15.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 16.
L. KOMISAR, supra note 165, at 10-11, 16-17.
J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 20-21 n.4.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
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with its obviously structural causes, would have disabused the society
of some of its moralistic approach to welfare. The combination of an
external economic cause of hardship with some real productive capacity to alleviate poverty might have produced a commitment to a minimum standard of well-being simply associated with the rights of
citizenship, an arrangement similar to the European model developed
since the nineteenth century.199
This did not happen, however. The New Deal brought at least
three categories of welfare programs, but none of them reflected a
commitment to eliminating or limiting poverty based simply on social
membership. First, New Deal programs reflected a strong belief that
the Depression was a temporary emergency; as a result, most policy
attention was directed to its most dramatic manifestation, unemployment. 200 Second, even under the impact of a disastrous structural failure, American public opinion did not let go of the belief that property
should be earned. Many of the programs contained a strong work
element, however imperfectly realized.201 (This category includes
many of the insurance programs, which are, at least in concept, only a
redistribution within a cfass as a provision against imprudence. 202)
Third, many of the New Deal reforms reflect a recognition that private
property arrangements create power relationships with sufficient political impact to compel recognition in the public sphere. Accordingly,
the federal government began involving itself as a kind of broker
among interests. 203
After World War II, two important phenomena occurred. First,
without any conscious effort or commitment in theory, the plight of
the poor began to improve. 204 Analysts attribute the development to
many sources: the existence of social security and the aging of the
population made an enormous dent in the number of aged poor, a
traditionally impoverished group; civil rights and other nonwelfare
changes in attitudes greatly increased the knowledge and willingness
of poor people to participate in what programs existed; 205 "sleeper"
programs like Medicaid turned out to be major vehicles for welfare;
and a bureaucracy of welfare grew up, including· the Social Security
199. Id. at 31.
200. Id. at 41-43.
201. See id. at 46-47 ("WPA," people said, stands for "We Piddle Around."); L. KOMISAR,
supra note 165, at 53-56.
202. L. KoMJSAR, supra note 165, at 60-61.
203. The classic example of this is the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1982).
204. J. PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 160-62.
205. L. KoMJSAR, supra note 165, at 92-93.
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Administration and state and local officials pressing the federal government for more and more relief. 206
The second phenomenon is incongruent: attitudes toward poverty
and poor people changed almost not at all. The most overt - one
might say the only overt - effort to address poverty as an evil in itself,
the War on Poverty, was always a one-man show by Lyndon Johnson,
acting out the populist fantasies of his youth in the wake of an aberrant electoral victory. 207 Never funded at a level remotely related to its
aspirations, 208 the most that can be said for the Office of Economic
Opportunity is that its cadres of Legal Services lawyers contributed to
the development of a "welfare rights" mentality, which at least allowed poor people to take advantage of the available, albeit piecemeal,
relief. 209
But, the poor are always with us. (See, I told you so.) Conservatives have attempted to address the problem with solutions consistent
with traditional American rights-based individualism, solutions like
reducing welfare payments to increase self-help210 or creating "enterprise zones." 211 Milton Friedman, in a characteristically original assault on the conventional wisdom, proposed years ago to redistribute a
reasonable amount of American surplus in the most neutral possible
form - negative income tax - but, the neo-Friedmanian Family
Assistance Program went to legislative defeat after a battlethat one of
its proponents characterized as like chasing the great white whale. 212
2.

Rights

The rights-based individualism - unassailably linked in the American debates about poverty to issues of race213 - that has characterized the public policy debate in the legislatures has also defeated
efforts to address poverty issues in the courts as constitutional matters.
As Professor Kenneth Karst has recently reminded us, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have consistently fenced out any constitutional
claim to relief from poverty under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, using traditional liberal pluralist concepts like
206. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 162-64, 169.
207. Id. at 133-34 ("[W]hen Lyndon Johnson called for a 'war on poverty,' ... 83% of
Americans thought poverty would never be done away with .... ").
208. Id. at 141, 151-52.
209. Id. at 153.
210. C. MURRAY, LoSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY: 1950-1980, at 227-33
(1984).
211. Temann, The On'gins of the Underclass, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1986, at 54, 66-68.
212. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 194.
213. Karst, supra note 23, at 4.
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a strict division between public and private spheres, an assumption of
governmental absence from market developments, demanding standards of causation, and, most powerfully, the slippery slope of the neutral viewpoint. 214
Every Burger Court critic has a favorite candidate for the most
poignant example of the Court's avoidance of the public implications
of poverty; 215 mine is the Supreme Court decision upholding the unequal local financing of public schools in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez. 216 At the time, I thought Rodriguez was
the worst of a lengthening list of bad Supreme Court decisions. It
seemed excessively mean of the Court to rub the plaintiffs' noses in it,
when they were really backing down a lot, agreeing to settle for equal
schools 100 years after Plessy. Not even equal really. The Rodriguez
plaintiffs merely sought to abolish the disparities in school financing
between school districts attributable to disparities in the value of the
taxable property in the various districts. 217 This most modest effort at
equalization falls far short of the- provision, for instance, of equal educational product or minimum educational product, or even of equal
expenditures per pupil. 218 In any case, the Supreme Court by a vote of
five to four rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the financing of education
based on the taxable property in each school district violated the equal
protection clause. 219 I now recognize that the Court was actually
balking not at the reactionary return to the Plessy norm, but at a potentially revolutionary development - addressing unequal distribution of the conditions of citizenship and in its most egregious form:
through an unequal public distribution network.
Plaintiffs' strategy of casting their radical claims in familiar rights
terms - while perhaps the likeliest avenue to success at the time simply gave the majority the opportunity to disguise their rejection as
214. Id. at 34-35.
215. See, e.g., id. at 33 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
216. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Just before this article went to press, I discovered that I was not the
only claimant for that position. See Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 307 (1989)
("The process of doctrinal ossification [of equal protection theory] culminated in .•• San Antonio
Independent School District Rodriguez."). Professor Balkin attributes the outcome in Rodriguez in considerable part to the rigidity of doctrine originating in the famous footnote four of
Carolene Products and its "ideology of democratic pluralism" which excluded consideration of
economic relationships from politics. Id. at 309. It is the thesis of this article that it is rights
analysis generally that produces this result.
217. 411 U.S. at 47.
218. Note, Strategies for School Finance Reform Litigation In the Post-Rodriguez Era, 21
NEW ENG. L. REV. 817, 821-22 (1985-1986). All the Rodriguez plaintiffs sought to accomplish
at the outset of this post-Brown era was "fiscal neutrality." Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep.
School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283-84 (W.D. Tex. 1971), revd., 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
219. 411 U.S. at 23-24.
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an equally innocuous application of equal protection doctrine. 220 Dividing the inquiry into the categories of suspect classifications and fundamental rights, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, first categorized
the classification in Rodriquez as pertaining not to poor or poorer people, but simply to people residing in poorly endowed school districts. 221 To accomplish this classification, he separated residency
from income. 222 Having separated the plaintiffs from a classification
based on income, Justice Powell concluded that the classification
lacked the indicia of suspectness: that is, the people affected by the
classification had not been saddled with extraordinary disability or
subjected to a history of purposeful discrimination. 223 (One peculiarity of the opinion is that, having failed to find a wealth-based classification, the Court nonetheless added, apparently gratuitously, that the
inability to pay becomes a constitutional disability only· where the
claimant is completely cut off from the service.224) One would have
thought that the degree of deprivation would have more ·to do with
Justice Powell's ·rejection of education as fundamental, and tha~ position appears in the opinion also. His starting place was the assertion
that the right must be explicit or implicit in the Constitution. Noting
that the plaintiffs failed to allege education inadequate to exercise explicit first amendment or voting rights, he assumed that the claim to
fundamental status rested solely on the importance of education, 225
and, based on the Court's recent rejection of other welfare claims such
as housing, he easily concluded that education makes no better claim
of importance and therefore must also be rejected.
The decision elicited a scathing opinion from Justice Marshall. 226
220. Neuman, Te"itorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 261, 279 (1987).
221. 411 U.S. at 19-20.
222. There is some question about the Court's analysis of the facts, which rests on a record
reflecting heavy concentrations of extremely poor in the poorest endowed districts and extremely
rich in the best endowed districts, with less congruence between family income and district
wealth in the middle. 411 U.S. at 26-27. First, the facts in Rodriguez, as most urban economic
studies reflect, do demonstrate some congruence between family income and school district financing. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMN. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY 413-14 (1969). Neither precedent nor sense supports the contention that a governmental
division must follow a suspect classification with mathematical precision to raise fourteenth
amendment concerns. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); General Elec. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976); 429 U.S. at 161 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1621-34 (1979). Under a less than foursquare analysis, one might say that a legislative scheme of local school financing which, on the whole, falls
more heavily on the poor, violates the equal protection clause.
223. 411 U.S. at 28.
224. 411 U.S. at 20-21.
225. 411 U.S. at 30-37.
226. 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Numerous state courts have exercised their federalism option and chosen to disagree with the Court, resting their holdings compelling some
equalization of education funding on a reading of their state constitutions. 227 More numerous commentators have criticized Rodriguez for
everything from bad theory to bad morals. 228 But Rodriguez is actually nothing more or less than a forthright acknowledgment of the role
of extreme individualism in American public life. Obviously, the complete absence of public education would be a more graphic example.
But, given the income-based mobility among widely differing local
school districts, 229 local financing encourages, if it does not actually
produce, something resembling a private school system (with the
kicker of federal tax deductibility for local taxes). 230
As will be set forth more fully below, 231 the state court decisions to
equalize school funding as a matter of state constitutional law suggest
a very different vision of the common life, at least in some communities. But on a national level, the background understandings remain in
the Lockean tradition: distribution of wealth is natural and can only
be upset by claims of right from the beneficiaries; such legitimate
claims are minimal.232 The Court's decision in 'Rodriguez demonstrates that, in this Lockean context, where most extremes of wealth
and poverty with all their attendant social consequences are accepted
as normal, 233 theories of equal protection will never fuel an evolution
to a different kind of community.
227. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Horton
v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1976); Rose y. Council for Better Educ., 1989 Ky.
LEXIS 55; Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified, 784
P.2d 412 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle
School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859
(W. Va. 1979); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); Washakie Co. School
Dist. No. One v. Herschl.er, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
228. Inman & Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1662 (1979); Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987); Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a
Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973); Note, Student Fees
in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1401 (1987); Comment,
Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1987); Comment, Inequality in Louisiana Public
School Finance: Should Educational Quality Depend on a Student's School District Residency?,
60 TuL. L. REv. 1269 (1986); Note, supra note 218, at 817.
229. See generally Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 228.
230. Coleman, Foreword to J. COONS, w. CLUNE & s. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION at vii (1970).
231. See infra notes 273-278 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
233. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 903-10.
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The Underclass

While the legislatures and federal courts were pursuing their individualist, rights-oriented course, social scientists discovered the permanent underclass, a subculture of poverty, suspiciously congruent
with concentrations of black Americans in the urban ghettos, and impervious to changes in the economic structure. 234 Cut off from traditional entry level jobs by the flight of manufacturing from urban
centers, 235 allegedly abandoned by the black middle and stable working class,236 the underclass that remains is in a state of near total destruction237 and social isolation. 238 Many unhappy political
implications arise from the existence of the underclass; the worst are
the perpetuation of poverty from one generation to the next239 and the
persistent departure of behavior from middle class norms. 240
Even before the social scientists gave the problem a name, rightsoriented constitutional scholars had offered variations on the fourteenth amendment theme as ·attempts to alleviate the condition of the
underclass. 241 The earliest approach was Frank Michelman's effort to
apply variants of Rawls' A Theory of Justice to establish a theory of
minimum welfare: that the equal protection clause requires the government to protect the poor against the most extreme hazards of their
impoverishment. Following Rawls' general approach, Michelman
asks what people behind the veil of ignorance would risk being unable
to afford. The answer identifies the category of goods Michelman
would remove from the market and subject to an equality-based political allocation. Clever as this effort is in sidestepping the slippery
slope and state action limits on the equal protection clause, it does,
however, raise serious objections of inconsistency with both text and
history. 242 Moreover, as set forth above, twenty more years of living
with A Theory ofJustice has revealed that Rawls' approach to distributive justice does not entirely avoid the problem of the slippery slide
into excessive heroism either.243
Kenneth Karst has come closer to both text and history of the
See supra note 172.
Wilson, supra note 172, at 11-12.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
Karst, supra note 23,·at 4 & n.10.
240. Id. at 17.
241. Edelman, supra note 23; Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 2; Michelman, supra note
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

23.
242. Michelman, supra note 23, at 13.
243. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
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fourteenth amendment in his "principle of equal citizenship," which
forbids society from excluding individuals or groups as respected, responsible, and participating members of the community. 244 Karst's
principle requires tliat the society, including the judiciary acting under
the fourteenth amendment, intervene "to foster the inclusion of the
marginalized poor . . . as equal citizens. " 245 Karst's test for judicial
action would inquire whether judges have "reason to believe that the
government would have filled the need if the decision makers had regarded the claimant not as part of an outsider group but as a full member of the society."246
But, as liberal legal scholarship critics Collins and Skover remirided us, Earl Warren is dead, and the post-Warren Court is not far
short of a generation old. As Karst freely acknowledges, the current
Supreme Court likely will continue to reject claims to constitutional
relief for marginalization through poverty. 247 And, although one does
not reject a political philosophy simply because of a few election returns, the failure of American liberal pluralism under any theory to
redress decidedly undesirable developments like the underclass should
certainly raise some doubts.
The answer lies, I think, in the crabbed interpretation of human
possibilities that has monopolized modem thinking. Left with little
more than self-interest as a guide to social justice, the best solution the
liberals have been able to come up with is to blind each founder of a
hypothetical regime to which selfish individual he or she will be. 248
Worse still, demonstrating the communitarians' vaunted human capacity to ignore hypothetical constructs, the governors of American
society249 have recognized themselves as the Qargely middle class,
white, male) persons250 they are and have simply cast the underclass
.into the role of the other - a group of strangers who have no claims
on the regime. Thus, value neutral pluralism and value neutral communitarianism have produced the identical outcome. It looks like the
character of the citizenry is a costly matter to ignore.
244. Karst, supra note 23, at 1-2; Karst, Equal Citizenship. supra note 2, at 5.
245. Karst, supra note 23, at 18.
246. Id. at 42.
247. Id. at 38. The Court's recent decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990),
affirming the authority of a federal judge to order local taxes to remedy school segregation, does
not indicate any weakening in the Court's rejection of constitutional claims beyond the fourteenth amendment's well established prohibition of official racial discrimination.
248. This is, of course, the central tenet of Rawls' A Theory ofJustice, and the focal point of
communitarian criticism. J. RAWLS, supra note 4. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2; M. SANDEL,
supra note 2.
249. See supra note 169 for definition of governing body.
250. Karst, supra note 23, at 25-26, 34.
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The Liberality Solution

Recognizing the role of the virtue of liberality in the American
regime is the first step toward abandoning unproductive rights-based
individualism. Although theory can only suggest what politics should
do, sharpening the focus on the communal and virtuous aspects of
public policymaking does seem to compel some consideration of the
details of such an enterprise. For example, in the United States, there
are several candidates for the active role in any public agenda. Most
remote from the private citizen is the life-tenured federal judiciary.
Public policy also comes from the federal legislature and its (putative)
servant, the administrative state. For most of American history, much
social responsibility lay with the state and local governments.251 The
state courts have until recently played a lesser role, but those times
seem to be ending.25 2 Finally, action from virtue in whole or in part
might come from the private sector.
Taking the last position first, as between the government and the
not-government, two lines of argument predominate. The first argument holds that, if the state coerces the behavior, it's not virtue. As
classicist Terence Irwin puts it: "Even if the result of private generosity is the very same as the result that the wise legislator would prescribe, the fact that it results from the private generosity of many is a
further good feature of it that is lost if the result is produced by legislation. "253 Liberality, by this reading, would be strictly limited to voluntary charity. Depending on whom you read, Americans either give
generously when the redistributive state does not get in the way254 or
give in depressingly small amounts. 255 The second argument against
public liberality is, of course, that even if it could lead the citizenry to
virtue through legislation, the state has no business inculcating virtue.
Each of these arguments rests on the essentially modern view of
the state as existing simply to preserve the physical well-being of immutably separate human actors. Despite his real insight into the es251. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 29-31.
. 252. See, e.g., Rose v. The Council for Better Educ. Inc., 1989 Ky. LEXIS 55 (state school
financing system held unconstitutional); Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684
(Mont. 1989), modified 784 P.2d 412 (1990) (same); Edgewood lndep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (same); cf Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township qf Mt.
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (each municipality must take its fair share of regional
growth including low and moderate income housing).
253. Irwin, supra note 88, at 45.
254. C. MURRAY, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 277 (1988).
255. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VQLUNTEERING IN THE UNITEP STATES:
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (1988) (average contribution to all charities was 1.5%
of annual. household income).
·
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cape from altruism, 256 ultimately this seems to be Feinberg's
position. 257 (In his ability to separate personal from public virtue, he
thus remains essentially modern.) As set forth above, the classical
concept of the polity - as cultivating and resting on human excellence
- is far from the modern view. In a classical republic, virtue was
both the end and the foundation of the good public order. Classical
political philosophy recognizes that law has a role in providing the
occasion for virtue. 258 This function takes two forms: educating the
young and habituating the society to virtuous behavior. Insofar as the
civic republican revival has traced a continuous thread of concern
with such virtue, both private and public, to the American founding,
the assumption that American politics is devoid of such concerns simply does not stand up.259
Moreover, even without definitive evidence from history, the critical issue is not whether virtue may play a role in the formulation of
public policy, but whether constitutional, political, or moral concerns
preclude any particular action. Here, as in the virtue/autonomy debate set forth above, 260 one must return to context. As far as liberality
is concerned, I think, the answer is relatively easy. At least since the
Progressive Era, and certainly since the New Deal, the American regime has included acceptance of the public construction and regulation of property. 261 Even in the redistributive models necessary to
address the underclass, considerations of confiscatory taking or crossing the boundary between minimum necessary security and equality of
property would not be pressing. That government regulation of property also fulfills public and personal virtue certainly should not invalidate otherwise legitimate action.
Moreover, although classical philosophy treats personal virtue as
an end in itself, 262 the Politics repeatedly remarks on the role of virtue
in promoting the value of social order. Thus, in his discussion of property, Aristotle emphasizes the ends of a moderate and private distribu256. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
257. J. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988) (THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMI·

NAL LAW vol. 4).
258. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 2.
260. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 CoLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Karst, supra note 23, at 22 (citing Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927)); Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and the
American Legal Order, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra note 184,
at 377.
262. See generally ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16.
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tion: social peace263 and industry. 264 In describing the desirability of
a moderate distribution of property as an actual constitution, Aristotle
again emphasizes avoiding the anti-social extremes of contempt among
the rich and envy among the poor. 265 Under the classical construction, then, liberality, a virtue directed at achieving the best life for
individuals and societies, does not require a mortal threat to the social
order before actions may be characterized as directed to the common
interest.
The role of law in inculcating virtue is the main answer to Irwin's
argument that governmental redistribution robs liberality of its virtue.
But, in addition, in a society governed by representative institutions,
the distinction between the governors and the governed is blurred, and
Irwin's "wise legislator" simply cannot be separated cleanly from the
property-owners she represents. Thus, if the initial act of liberality
takes the form of legislation, the processes of majoritarianism, however blurred, replicate for the society the self-governance represented
by the virtues.
For this reason, Congress, not the judiciary, is the preferred instrumentality for implementation. In this, then, I dissent from the civic
republican infatuation with the insularity of the governors. 266 Life
tenure plays a valuable role in the scheme, of course, 267 but the postNew Deal elevation of the judiciary to rabbinic status may have had a
hand in relieving the rest of us from our role as the people of the book.
The second reason for preferring the legislature is a prudential one.
Taking affirmative steps, even the very modest ones I suggest, involves
social and political judgments of some sensitivity, judgments that can
be, and sometimes are, tempered and refined in the legislative process.268 Finally,- as set forth above, the liberality solution sidesteps the
floodgates claims of perfectjustice, 269 and legislation, not judicial decisionmaking, has traditionally provided the solutions of partial and imperfect justice. This assignment of responsibility has stood up fairly
well over time. 270
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 181.
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom and Bork, supra note 8, at 193.
See Collins & Skover, supra note 3, at 201; Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party
Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988);
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988).
269. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (Maryland legislature not
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

obliged to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all.").
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As between the states or municipalities on one hand and the federal government on the other, the choice is not so obvious. Local government has the longest history of providing for the citizens' wellbeing, 211 and there are long-standing arguments in favor of small communities as repositories of republican values. 272 As set forth above,
since the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, several state courts
have found rights to equal education funding in state constitutions,273
and three such opinions, issued just within the past year, hold out
some promise for the states as· repositories of civic virtue. 274 This
promise rests more on the rhetoric than on the holdings in the cases,
since the issues in this article are much broader than the outcome in
Rodriguez, and each of the three decisions rests on state constitutional
language quite different from the language of the equal protection
clause. 275
Nonetheless, even if treated only as pieces of political rhetoric, the
opinions from the state courts articulate a vision of a common political
life far superior to the impoverished vision of the federal decision. 216
Thus, in Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court quoted at length from the
debates over the framing of the Kentucky provision:
If public schools have come to stay, if they are a part and parcel of our
free institutions, woven into the very web and woof of popular government; and if they are in the future to be the dependence of the people of
Kentucky for the instruction of their youth, what is the logic of the situation? Manifestly to encourage and improve them, ... in so far as we
love our children[,] to try to make their training-places fit nurseries of
immortal spirits that have divine purposes to fulfill on earth, and cannot
hope to succeed, unless their intellectual powers be properly
developed. 277
271. J. PATIERSON, supra note 16S, at 29-30.
272. See Pangle, Justice and Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1S7, 161 (1989) ("[T]he
republican culture of ancient Athens, like that of ancient Rome, of the medieval Italian cities •••
was much more tight-knit, more censorious and intolerant, and also more communitarian than
our political system.").
273. See supra note 227.
274. See Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Rose v. The Council for Better Educ.
Inc., 1989 Ky. LEXIS SS.
27S. The Texas Constitution requires an "efficient" system of public education to provide for
"general diffusion of knowledge." VERNON'S ANN. TEXAS CONST. art. 7, § 1. The Kentucky
Constitution requires "the General Assembly ... [to] provide for an efficient system of common
schools throughout the State." KY. CONST. § 183. Under Montana's Constitution "[e]quality of
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state." MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1,
cl. I.
276. See Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex: 1989); Rose v. The Council for Better Educ.
Inc., 1989 Ky. LEXIS SS.
277. Rose, 1989 Ky. LEXIS SS. Similarly, in Edgewood, the Texas Court quoted one of the
framers of the Texas Constitution: "I boldly assert that [education] is for the general welfare of
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Moreover, each of the state education funding decisions sidesteps
the institutional competence issue by entering into the now familiar
pattern of give and take with the legislature, delaying the effective date
of the decision about the problem to allow the legislature to address
the specifics of the solution.2 78
Accordingly, nothing in my preferred solution should be taken to
preempt a state level initiative, but several factors indicate that the
states are not the first avenues of attack. First, the level of governmental action should reflect the reality of the American economy and society. Arguably since the ratification of the Constitution, and certainly
since the New Deal, 279 essential aspects of American economy have
been subject to national regulation. 280 With the New Deal, social service, harnessed to the power of the federal income tax, became centered in the federal govemment. 281 Finally, the Supreme Court
decision in Shapiro v. Thompson, 282 striking down residency requirements on welfare as violative of the constitutional right to travel, put
the constitutional seal on what had become socially apparent long
before: America could not draw state lines around the underclass.
Conversely, the federal union retains the power to exclude people
from its political borders, including for economic reasons, 283 and the
power to control its economic business, insofar as economic arrangements are ever subject to definitive political governance. 284 Accordingly, since both the taxation/redistribution machinery and the
community of potential recipients are national, it seems counterintuitive to break up any public policy suggestions by states. Finally, and
most importantly, although liberality is not hung up on the free rider
problem, the goal of inculcating virtue through public life will be
weakened if citizens can escape by moving to another location within
the polity. 285
all, rich and poor, male and female, that the means of a common school education should, if
possible, be placed within the reach of every child in the State." Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 395.
278. See cases cited supra note 227.
279. Parrish, supra note 261, at 380-83.
280. Id. at 379.
281. Id. at 379.
282. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has authority "to establish an uniform [r]ule of
[n]aturalization"). See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. l, 10 (1977) (naturalization is an exclusively federal concern).
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has authority "to regulate commerce with foreign [n]ations"). See also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (states may not regulate
foreign commerce); Trustees of the Univ. of III. v. United States, 389 U.S. 48 (1939).
285. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Resources: An Economic Study ofLaw and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (discussion of the circumstances
most likely to stimulate rescue behavior).
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In addition to addressing the supply side of liberality, no public
policy analysis would be complete without exploring the other half of
the virtue: the moral and intellectual judgment about recipients.
Throughout this article, I have linked the failure of liberality in the
American regime with the continued presence of the underclass. One
might, however, unpack the two phenomena, concluding, for instance,
that the virtue of liberality should be pursued for its benefit to the
giver, but that the distribution should be directed at any of a myriad of
other social projects.
Classical political philosophy supplies at least two arguments in
favor of choosing to address the underclass. First, classical philosophy
asserts - and, as set forth above, this is a significant difference between ancient and modern theory286 - three premises: the individual
has the capacity for practicing virtue, the society needs virtuous citizens, and the society must provide tJie occasions for virtue. In Book I
of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states the premises: the good in
life is related to the function of the actor; 287 the function of humans
apart from all other creatures is the activity of the soul in conformance
with reason; 288 anyone not maimed in personal potentiality for virtue
may win it by study and care. 289 Finally, and significantly for this part
of the inquiry, Aristotle teaches that the exercise of virtue may require
external goods, like friends and riches and political power as instruments. 290 In the Politlcs, Aristotle links the exercise of virtue to the
health of the state.2 9 1 Man is political; the virtues have value in large
measure because they are also the excellences of character which promote social life.
What does all this mean for the allocation to the underclass of the
liberal person's wealth? The answer should be relatively clear. If virtue is of value, allowing people the means to become virtuous has the
same value. Moreover, in a political society, the virtue of the people
comprises the quality of the society. One option in political society is,
of course, to exclude the people who, through maimed souls or a lack
of external goods, have not demonstrated a capacity for virtue. 292
286. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
287. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 12-13.
288. Id. at 13-14.
289. Id. at 18.
290. Id. at 17.
291. See supra notes 68 and accompanying text.
292. This was a very real possibility to Aristotle; perhaps the greatest barrier to Aristotelian
political philosophy in the modem world is his easy acceptance of human slavery as a natural
condition of life. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 11-12, 104, 111-12, 306. But see S.
OKIN, supra note 15.
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Here, I think, is the role of Kenneth Karst's principle of equal citizenship. Given the fourteenth amendment and the various Supreme
Court decisions and civil rights statutes of the last generation, the solution of excluding the underclass from American political life is simply not available. Whether they vote in reasonable numbers or not, 293
in a political society in which the right to vote is the mark of political
belonging, 2 9 4 the underclass remains part of the political society. 295 In
this construct, the cultural, geographical, gender and racial divisions,
which have supported the continuing marginalization of the underclass from society defined other than politically,296 do not apply.
Moreover, as the social science literature reflects more exigently each
da)'., every urban society in the country is affected by the danger and
dis.affection of the lives of the underclass. 29 7 Under these circumstances, considerations of individual virtue and of the quality of the
communal life strongly support the judgment to distribute the wealth
that liberality produces to address the problem of the underclass.
Assuming that federal legislation directed at tlie underclass were to
be the vehicle for change, what might guide the actual choice of solutions? One answer might lie in the surprising resiliency of the concept
of decent minimum education even in face of the Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez. The roots of such a concept are deep: when the
Framers were most engaged in how they would govern their new
lands, they provided, in the Northwest Ordinance, that land be set
aside for local school construction. 298 During Reconstruction, serious
debate focused on the possibility of providing federal education to the
newly emancipated slaves. 2 9 9 By the end of the nineteenth century,
almost every state constitution included a commitment to public education, and over half the constitutions required it to be free. 300 Since
293. See generally E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S
VIEW OF DEMOCRAC_Y IN AMERICA 97-113 (1960); K. SHIENBAUM, BEYOND THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF VOTING IN CoNTEMPORARY AMERICAN
POLITICS (1984).
294. K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 35-36.
295. In this, the members of the underclass are like Aristotle's citizens who have a claim to
office, whether or not they give it away. See M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 349
(1986).
296. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 172.
298. M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE
LAW 566 (2d ed. 1982).
299. W. WIECEK, supra note 171, at 185-86.
300. Note, Student Fees in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 lowA L.
REV. 1401, 1402 n.16 (1987) (citing constitutions that require some form of public education:
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amend. CXI; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 6; HAW. CONST.·art. x, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX,§ 3; KY. CONST.§ 183; LA. CONST. art.
VIII,§ 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § l; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MINN. CONST. art.
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the decision in Rodriguez, numerous state courts have expanded the
access to education under state constitutions in decisions striking
down or limiting the imposition of fees for school-related activities and
imposing various levels of funding equalizers. 301 Commentators have
suggested that the Supreme Court's decision be reconsidered on the
coattails of a softening of the levels of eqyal protection theory, 302 as an
example of applying international human rights to illuminate fundamental constitutional claims, 303 or as an aspect of incorporating
Rawls' theory of equality of opportunity into the fourteenth
amendm~nt. 304

Even if such a rethinking of equal protection were practical, each
XIII, § l; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OR.
CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § l; UTAH CONST. art. x,
§ l; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; wASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Wvo. CONST. art. VII, § 1, § 9; and
citing constitutions that require free public education: ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § l; CAL. CONST.
art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § l; DEL. CONST. art. x, § l;
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § l; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ff l; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § l; ILL.
CONST. art. x, § l; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § l; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1, § 6(b); Mo. CONST.
art. VIII, § l; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX,
§ l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § l; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, ff l;
N.M. CoNST. art. XII, § l; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § l; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST.
art. VIII,§ 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII,§ l; S.C. CoNST. art. XI,§ 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII,§ l;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § l; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § l; W.VA.
CONST. art. XII, § l; WIS. CONST. art. x, § 3).
301. Hartzell v. Connell, 35 Cal. 3d 899, 911, 679 P.2d 35, 43, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 (1984)
(imposition of fees violates constitutional guarantee); Beck v. Board of Educ., 63 III. 2d 10, 1516, 344 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1976) (financially able children must pay fees); Chandler v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 160 Ind. App. 592, 597-98, 312 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1974) (fee waiver
makes book fees constitutional); Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor School Dist., 383 Mich.
693, 700-02, 178 N.W.2d 484, 487-88 (1970) (books and school supplies essential part of free
education); Attorney Gen. v. East Jackson Pub. Schools, 143 Mich. App. 634, 637, 372 N.W.2d
638, 639-40 (1985) (nonessential activities can require fee if it can be waived by students who
cannot afford to pay); Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School Dist. 18, 548 S.W.2d 554, 561
(Mo. 1977) (course fees are unconstitutional); Granger v. Cascade County School Dist. No. 1,
159 Mont. 516, 527-29, 499 P.2d 780, 786 (1972); Norton v. Board of Educ., 89 N.M. 470, 471·
72, 553 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (1976) (all required courses must be free); Vandevender v. Cassell,
158 W. Va. 87, 93-94, 208 S.E.2d 436, 439-40 (1974) (concurring opinion) (materials must be
provided free of charge to needy students); Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609,
617-1~, 264 S.E.2d 106, 112-14 (1980) (appropriate fee waiver is constitutional right of indigent
children); Board of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 187, 222 N.W.2d 143, 147-48 (1974) (fees
constitutional if statutes provide waiver for indigents); see also cases cited supra note 227; cf.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Educ. Assn. v. Board of Educ., 188 N.J. Super. 161, 169-70, 457 A.2d 15,
20 (App. Div. 1983) (fee may be charged for nonessential course); Marshall v. School Dist. Re
No. 3 Morgan County, 191 Colo. 451, 453-54, 553 P.2d 784, 785-86 (1976) (no constitutional
duty to furnish nonindigent children books without cost). But see Carpio v. Tucson High School
Dist. No. 1, 111 Ariz. 127, 128-29, 524 P.2d 948, 949-50 (1974) ("as nearly free as possible" gives
legislature discretion), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 982 (1975).
302. This projection rests largely on the Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), striking down a Texas law refusing to fund public education for the children of
undocumented aliens. However commendable the results in Plyler. the opinion does not even
hint at reconsidering the class issue at the heart of Rodriguez.
303. Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms
to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1987).
304. Richards, supra note 228, at 52.
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of these solutions suffers most visibly from the perfectionist defects of
righ~s analysis. Even assuming, as any city-dweller intuits to be the
case, that household poverty and school district poverty overlap, they
do so imperfectly. 305 So, redistributing from the wealthier school districts to the poorer ones is an imperfect way to address the problems of
poverty, if that is one's underlying goal. On the level of simple equality of opportunity, for years the debate over education has been dogged by the social science data that pricier schools, divorced from other
social factors like families and neighborhood, do not improve children's fates at all. 306 Yet despite all of these flaws, access to meaningful education makes a claim on the sensibility of the American
community that refuses to vanish. It is a need with immense implications for the community to which perfect solutions are rare. For all of
these reasons, education is the paradigm case for replacement of rights
analysis with the exercise of the virtue of liberality.
Although detailed public policy prescriptions are beyond the scope
of this article, it probably pays to digress here for a moment to describe the Perry Preschool Study. 307 In the study, the High/Scope
Foundation of Ypsilanti, Michigan, followed the progress of 123 black
children from poor families who had been randomly assigned to attend
preschool or not to attend preschool in the sixties. The preschool program consisted of 2 1/i hours per day five days per week, plus a 1 1/2
hour per week home visit, 7 1/2 months per year for two years. 308 (As
of the latest study, the children were nineteen. 309) The High/Scope
staff studied school records, police and court records, records of social
service use, and interviewed almost 100 of the participants. 310
The results are compelling. Sixty-seven percent of the preschoolers
graduated from high school; only forty-nine percent of the control
group did. 311 Fifty percent of the preschoolers were working at the
time of the interview; only thirty-two percent of the control. group
were. 312 Looking at undesirable life events, thirty-one percent of the
preschoolers had at one time been ilITested, while fifty-one percent of
305. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
306. J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
307. J. BERRURTA, L. SCHWEINHART, W. BARNEIT, A. EPSTEIN & D. WEJKART,
CHANGED LIVES (Monograph of the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation No. Eight,
1984) [hereinafter CHANGED LIVES].
'
'
308. Id. at 8.
309. Id. at xiv.
310. Id. at 5-12.
311. Id. at 31 (Table 8).
312. Id. at 47 (Table 12).
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the control group had. 313 Female preschoolers had 49 teen
pregnancies per 100; control group females had 64 per 100. 314 Moreover, and contrary to the now pretty completely discredited early negative evaluations of Head Start, 315 the latest Perry study reveals that,
where data were kept, seven studies from communities across the
country support the Perry findings of intellectual performance, avoidance of special education, and preventing dropout, along with mixed
evidence of increased scholastic achievement. 316 A society composed
of graduates of the Perry Preschool Program, half unemployed, thirty
percent with arrest records, many pregnant in their teens, may not be
Allan Bloom's notion of the civic republic, 317 but it sure beats the
altemative.31 8
Any consideration of specific social science remedies must also include the extraordinarily comprehensive recent study by the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. 319 Although the volume includes a number
of serious and provocative essays suggesting policy initiatives ranging
from computer job opportunity networks to housing vouchers, Jennifer Hochschild's essay, "Equal Opportunity and the Estranged
Poor,"320 speaks most frankly of the political realities that produced
and ignore the underclass and of how to address them.
Hochschild first reminds the reader that "[m]uch of American history can be read as a set of political choices that created and consolidated racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in wealth and power." 321
After a period of political decisions aimed at "opening channels of
opportunity"322 during the 1950s and 1960s, Americans made an "apparent rightward move"; 323 the real value of AFDC declined by 27%
between 1970 and 1983, while between 1979 and 1985, "the annual
median family income for the poorest 40 percent of the population
declined $918 (in constant 1986 dollars) whereas the wealthiest 40 percent of families gained $2775, and the wealthiest 10 percent gained
313. Id. at 64 (Table 19).
314. Id. at 2 (Table 1).
315. See G. STEINER, THE CHILDREN'S CAUSE 32-35 (1976) (describing early studies critical

of Head Start programs).
316. CHANGED LIVES, supra note 307, at 95-105.
317. See A. BLOOM, supra note 52.
318. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 346-48.
319. 501 ANNALS, supra note 172.
320. Hochschild, Equal Opportunity and the Estranged Poor. in id. at 143.
321. Id. at 146.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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$6369." 324 Hochschild's main point is this: "Political choices ranging
from slavery to a preference for unemployment over inflation in the
context of a particular ideological framework helped to create a group
of people with no resources, no skills, and no faith." 325
Hochschild's essay is a prescription, not a condemnation, and
therein lies its interest. As she puts it, "despite controversy over what
the underclass is and whether and why it is growing, analysts surprisingly concur on what to do about it." 326 Each of the three programs
she describes includes an element addressing a discrete problem joblessness, teen pregnancy, or high school dropout - but also includes a broad range of social efforts to provide the kind of "care that
is as multidimensional as the care that's supposed to come from one's
own family." 327 As Hochschild sums up her findings, "[t]he common
thread in these disparate programs and analyses is that successful efforts to aid the estranged poor cost a lot, last a long time, and involve a
wide array of activities aimed at changing skills, views, and life
circumstances. " 328
Having thus frankly acknowledged the investment, Hochschild
also admits that her suggestions will never produce the returns associated with perfectionism:
Some analysts argue that [remedial] programs "not only improve the
lives of participa[nts] but 'save public moneys as well' " ....
Other analysts are less sanguine about both the ratio of financial benefits to costs and the long-term social benefits of these programs. But the
question is not whether these programs are as successful as we would
like - they are not - or as successful as many programs that serve a
less disadvantaged population - they are not. The issue is whether
Americans are willing to let some fellow citizens destroy their own and
others' lives without using the available knowledge to stop some of the
destruction. 329

Although far from the world of classical philosophy, Hochschild ends
her appeal with a description as good as any of the kind of virtue that
would "adom" 330 the American regime: "Public opinion surveys have
shown repeatedly that Americans want to be generous toward people
in need; they want to be free from gender and racial discrimination;
they want people to have jobs that support them and their
324. Id. at 147 (citing data from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (Washington, D.C. 1985)).
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 151-52 (footnotes omitted).
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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children. " 331
CONCLUSION

As I write this conclusion, the shelves in my office at the law
school are filled with the books I've been using - Nicomachean Ethics, A Theory of Justice, Private Wealth and Public Education, Spheres
of Justice, Be.longing to America. A couple of months ago, my dean
wandered in, and, seeing me deep in a copy of Justice and the Human
Good, he said (hope springing eternal in the decanal breast, no doubt),
"I can't believe I even have to pay you to do such good stuff."
The drawback, of course, is legalarboraphobia (fear of being a law
review article falling in an empty forest). Yet even here, Aristotle has
wisdom. In any society, the politically dominant class - the governing body - is the regime. These are the people "who 'rule' in a
stronger or more precise sense than ordinary citizens and therefore
require a training in prudence beyond what is available through the
experience of ordinary political life." 332 And in America, a century
and a half of lawyers have had their heads swelled by Tocqueville's
description of the regime:
The government of democracy is favorable to the political power of lawyers; for when the wealthy, the noble, and the prince are excluded from
the government, the lawyers take possession of it, in their own right, as it
were, since they are the only men of information and sagacity, beyond
the sphere of the people, who can be the object of the popular choice. 3 3 3

But those of us whom the dean pays to educate the regime would do
well to read on:
I am not ignorant of the defects inherent in the character of this body of
men; but without this admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the democratic principle, I question whether democratic institutions could long be
maintained; and I cannot believe that a republic could hope to exist at
the present time if the influence of lawyers in public business did not
increase in proportion to the power of the people. 334

331.
332.
333.
334.

Hochschild, supra note 320, at 155.
Lord, supra note 169, at 139.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285-86 (P.Bradley ed. 1945).
Id. at 286.

